In a TV interview with Australia’s Studio 10, shipwreck hunter David Mearns reveals that he would like to mount a privately-funded search for MH370.
From the interview:
“But since the search has been suspended, which I think is basically an unacceptable thing to have happened, I’ve been working with some families and some experts to see if we could actually mount a privately-funded search for the plane, because it’s inexcusable that that wreckage isn’t located, because it can be found. They just have to look in the right place.”
“It can be found. The technology is there to find it. They just need to be able to look in the right place.”
“And they’re narrowing the areas. The next search will be smaller than what’s been already done.”
“And everybody should be concerned about this, because until that black box is found, and we recover the black boxes, we don’t know what happened.”
When asked if they are looking the right place, he responded, “No, because they have not found it. When they look in the right place, they will find it. And it can be done. I’m here to tell people that it can be done.”
“And that’s the other key thing. Technology has moved on, so now that we can search much faster than before.”
When asked if he thinks he can find MH370, he responded, “I never guarantee these things, but I believe it is definitely worth doing. There’s an area that can be searched in an efficient way, and I believe we don’t just owe it to the families. But I think, internationally, it’s an important thing to do.”
“This will be the first time a major aircraft like this has been lost without any resolution or any lessons learned about why it crashed. And that is not only unacceptable, it’s inexcusable for the authorities not to be able to continue to do something.”
I should add that David Mearns has had extensive discussions and meetings with some members of the MH370 Independent Group (IG), in which many of our analyses and findings have been shared. I hope that collaboration continues.
@VioctorI,
You said: “@DrB: OK. Got it. Your theory is some sequence of failures combined with unexplained manual interventions and no attempt to land at Penang.”
1. “No attempt to land at Penang” is a fact, not a theory.
2. The “manual interventions” are not “unexplained”. If power were lost to a lot of comms and TCAS equipment during a flight, you would try to restore power too, and you would try to do it before attempting a landing.
2. The theory of an accident is not “mine”, but I regard it as a distinct possibility. I see no evidence that precludes it.
@DrB: We agree on (1). But if there were failures, in light of (1), any other manual interventions are unexplained. If there was a failure, it makes no sense to fly past a very suitable and familiar airport (Penang) and then 30 minutes later attempt a landing at an unsuitable airport (Banda Aceh). If there was an intentional diversion, we might not know the intentions, the plan, or how things unfolded. However, if there was a failure, we do know what pilots would do to save the crew and passengers. Flying past Penang makes no sense in that context.
@TBill,
You said: “I agree that it is very important if there is evidence of depressurization. I am wondering if not cold soak, but rarefied air could change the heat up behavior, due to less heat transfer away from the unit.”
That is a good point, but the thermal mass of the OCXO is quite small compared to the thermal mass of the SDU enclosure. That means that you don’t have to change the temperature of the SDU itself very much in order to heat the crystal inside it to 75C. The rarefied air will definitely affect the steady-state enclosure temperature, but I don’t think it will have a major effect on the OCXO warm-up time, which should depend primarily on the initial OCXO temperature.
@VictorI,
You said: However, if there was a failure, we do know what pilots would do to save the crew and passengers. Flying past Penang makes no sense in that context.”
That is your opinion, and on this we disagree. The PIC may have initially decided that the landing could be made more safely by first achieving functionality of safety-related equipment items (communications and TCAS). That was not yet achieved when Penang was passed.
@Dennis
In your reply to my earlier post, you deliberately misquoted me in a transparent but dubious attempt to support your argument, at the expense of mine.
You misquoted me as saying “Lets be absolutely clear, the reason why Holland and his peers, and the ATSB had to regard it as an outlier, was because they were not allowed to assume a scenario where the pilot deliberately switched off the SATCOM”
Dennis, What I actually said was “Lets be absolutely clear, the reason why Holland and his peers, and the ATSB had to regard it as an outlier, was because they were not allowed to assume a scenario where the pilot deliberately switched off the SATCOM and depressurize the plane”.
You deliberately left off the “and depressurize the plane”.
Then you said “Holland makes it perfectly clear in his paper that it is believed that the 18:25:27 logon was the result of a power restoration to the AES. That has nothing whatever to do with categorizing the BFO value at that time as an outlier.”
Well, at least I’m in furious agreement with you on something, ie. that it is believed that the logon at 18:25 was the result of a power restoration to the AES. Pity you still cannot allow yourself to entertain the idea of a deliberate depressurization.
@DrB: If a pilot decided an immediate landing was not feasible as he passed a very suitable airport, he would stay close to the airport, descend, and circle, not continue flying away from it at cruise altitude. That’s not just my opinion. It’s what ex-B777 pilot @Andrew has said. It’s also what makes sense. There would be no guarantee that the next airport could be reached. Banda Aceh is over [290] NM from Penang.
[Later edit.]
@ROB
My quote was a cut and paste. I did not think think the depressurization or no depressurization was relevant to our discussion. I had absolutely no intention to “bend” your argument. You are the second person to recently accuse me of mischaracterizing what they said.
The depressurization is a complete non-starter due to the cell phone registration near Penang. Someone, presumably the owner of the phone, had to be adjacent to a window for the registration to happen. It is actually quite remarkable that it occurred at all. It would be virtually impossible with the phone located in a non line of site position (in the pocket of someone lying on the floor of the aircraft) relative to the cellular base station.
Additionally, my position has never been that the diversion was for a suicide motive.
I am in the mood for pity, however. Been working very hard harvesting wood.
@DrB
OK…airrcaft in the air is what? 8000-ft Presure Alt inside the aircraft even in the base case
@VI
I seem to recall Andrew does not prefer Banda Aceh as a place to land either
@David,
Thanks for commenting on the effect of power loss on the air conditioning. You said: “Contrarily, aside from total electrical isolation not causing extreme cold with engines running, it would prompt the APU to auto-start, providing replacement electrical power for a pack or both, thence needing switch off.”
Can you envision a scenario where the APU would auto-start and run from 17:22 to ~18:25, but then shut down until MEFE occurred when it would auto-start again?
Just another thought on the Lido-radar-tracks.
It was presumed that at least the second track after Pelau Perak till 18:22 could not be from Western Hill for this station has a much wider range. Which is true.
And the ’18:02′ track ends at the unexplained gap between both tracks.
To me the possibiliy of the complete Lido-track being composed from two different radar-stations is quite realistic.
The ’18:02′ track could come from Butterworth and the ’18:22′ track from Thai Sangkhla radar station. Those tracks ~fit the max ranges of those stations.
The gap between both tracks could be explained by the first track ending because of Butterworth max radar range.
And the second track, beginning after the gap, caused by terrain-masking due to the position of the Sangkhla radar-station on the east-coast of Thailand.
The offset between both tracks could then also be only a misalignement due to slightly different interference and processing of the radar-data.
Or just a flaw in the Lido-projection which is not showing a primary radar-screen but the projection of primary radar-tracks on another (secondary radar?) screen.
We don’t know how precise this projection was done. Anyway it would have been very difficult to do this in an exact way imo.
@TBill,
You said: I seem to recall Andrew does not prefer Banda Aceh as a place to land either”
No one does. For many reasons Banda Aceh would not be a preferred landing location (unmanned, at night, etc.).
There is no clear evidence signalling an “attempt” to land. You can interpret the pass by Penang as indicating a diversion to a suitable airport, but we can’t know that for sure.
However, there are two clues that a descent could have been made near 18:40. The BFOs then can be interpreted as a descent (one of two possibilities). And there is still Kate Tee’s unexplained sighting near NOPEK at ~19:00 of an aircraft heading south at a much-reduced altitude. Could that have been 9M-MRO at ~10,000 feet? If it were, why the descent to ~10,000 feet? The only reasons I can think of are because of depressurization or the intention to make a landing (and the best nearby alternative then would be Banda Aceh).
@All
Just would like to once again reiterate how amazing it is given the sim data, the 18:25 re-power on (give it up Dennis), the timing of the diversion, ONLY Fariq’s phone connect that we are aware of, where the airplane actually more or less ended up, that it is still missing (uh, deliberate, duh), Malaysia’s behavior and lack of transparency and disinformation campaign, Z’s we chat with Tim Pardi, .Z’s conversation with flight engineer, Z’s rabid politics followed by PKR’s devastating defeat and subsequent Z’s retreat into silence etc…the ominous tone on his social media postings, the posting of PBCatalina landing in the middle of a body of water surprising unsuspected fisherman (odd), his bizarre alternative face book account, his diy fixer-up cryptic videos…shall I go on. opportunity, motive, experience, capability. And his Fuck you by flying directly into hornets nest of the mainland and then hightailing it out and skirting Indo FIR. And all this to avoid unintentional catastrophic disaster while the plane flies for 7 plus more hours. Beyond, beyond preposterous. Hysterically ridiculous and ridicule is well deserved of those who cling to some fantasy non-deliberate scenario. I mean, REALLY?
@Victor. In previous thread you made cryptic allusion to … reason to believe that lido captures were not MH370. Would you care to expand, even if in speculation ?
@paul onions. you and I are nearly in perfect alignment of theory, the difference being what happened in the 30 minutes before 1840.
@Donald: This is not the website for ridicule. Although I believe the weight of the evidence leans towards intentional diversion by the captain, @DrB and @Mick Gilbert deserve the opportunity to present their views and get respectful responses.
@Paul Smithson: I did not mean to be cryptic. I also don’t want to be repetitive. There are several reasons why I think we should apply healthy skepticism to the Lido data:
1) The radar data shared that Malaysia shared with the ATSB and the DSTG was in 10 second increments ending at 18:02 except for a single capture at 18:22, which they say was too inaccurate to use for path reconstructions. (I am assuming that the ATSB and the DSTG have the same access and opinions about the radar data until somebody can prove to me otherwise.) If the Lido data was valid, it is hard to imagine why it was not shared with the ATSB, especially since the Lido image was shared with the NOK in public setting.
2) If MH370 continued on N571 after 18:22, to satisfy the BTO criteria requires an offset manoeuver that starts just after the last radar capture and ends right around the log-on at 18:25. I am very suspicious of scenarios that require unobserved, precisely-timed events unless those events are somehow coordinated manually or automatically.
3) If you start at the position of the capture at 18:02, there are straight line, constant speed paths that satisfy the BTO and BFO data, with no offset manoeuver required. Those paths are therefore the simplest of paths.
Please note that I am not declaring the Lido data to be invalid. I am simply expressing uncertainty for the reasons outlined above.
@Victor
You said “although I believe the weight of the evidence **leans** toward intentional diversion by the captain”.
When you use words such a ‘weight’ and ‘lean’, the inference is that the interpretation of the events taking place in the air that night remain ‘too close to render a firm and resolute judgement on”. Is this your belief, still? I mean, what will it take to solidify a conclusion?
What evidence, specifically, leans toward an unintentional diversion resulting in the loss of 239 souls and the disappearance of an aircraft into the SIO?
Please enlighten those on this forum whom favor unintentional catastrophic ‘hull’ loss as to what arrived at evidence directly points or lends itself to non-nefarious intent? There is NONE, yet the irrational simulations and scenarios persist.
Not surprisingly, I can find not one piece of evidence that in a clear way suggests something other than deliberate action with malice. I would welcome and be receptive to any demonstrable evidence suggesting otherwise? As I’m sure we all would?
In support of DennisW’s proposal there is an argument for MH370 to have come round below Sumatra through ISBIX and down past the Cocos Islands and carried on to the 7th arc.
For this to have happened the plane would have needed to have slowed, probably at a much lower altitude, to be doing only about 370 kts between the 3rd and 4th arcs.
If it continued at a similar speed towards the 7th arc it would have ended up no further than about 22S.
Assuming a reasonably steady speed all the way from the 3rd arc this is a doable proposition.
The diversion from Igari to south of Penang is all consistent with a crew diverting the aircraft to a suitable airport following an accident (oxygen bottle rupture).
It turned initially towards the nearest airport (Kota Bharu) and may have even flown over Mimos (approach point for runway 10 at Kota Bharu).
Then headed to Kendi (approach point for runway 04 at Penang).
Since this flight path is consistent with a standard diversion, then it would be highly likely that a standard diversion to Banda Aceh via Vampi-Mekar-Nilam-Sanob was programmed. This could have been performed by the Flight Crew (suffering from mild hypoxia) or by a passenger/flight attendant (who have found the flight crew unconscious from hypoxia since their oxygen bottle was ruptured).
The 1825 log on is caused automatically when the Right High Gain Antenna (mounted on right side of fuselage) is finally exposed to the satellite when the aircraft turns left at Nilam, since the Left High Gain Antenna is inoperative.
The damage to the Left AIMS cabinet (which contains modules for the Satellite Data Unit) is the cause of the abnormal BFOs.
If APU was on, aircraft ends within 100 nautical miles south of 38S88E. IFE was load shed. Area has never been searched!
@Gysbreght,
@VictorI,
@sk999,
@Andrew,
Thanks for enlightening me on the effect of the different wing design for the 300ER versus 200ER and on the difference between CI=180 and LRC. Still, I think the 300ER speed curves for various CIs are an aid in understanding what the 200ER curves may look like. I have asked ATSB if they can provide similar data for the 200ER, but I’m not holding my breath on that one.
@Donald
“Malice” seems strong to me. I truly believe the loss of the aircraft and the deaths of everyone on board was not the preferred outcome of the perpetrator(s). I have stopped evangelizing motive since it is not helpful in locating the aircraft.
@Donald: Evidence against diversion by the captain? Simple. The actions of a pilot flying to the SIO don’t fit with typical human behavior. If suicidal, he wouldn’t need a 7 hour diversion before taking his life. If for political reasons, a pilot that was concerned about corruption and non-democratic actions of his government shouldn’t express political discontent by murdering 238 people, including many Malaysians, even if there were negotiations that were conducted and failed. Yet, the evidence leans towards the captain planning a diversion to the SIO. On balance, I think it is more likely that we don’t understand the captain’s motivations and mental state than the circumstances of what appears to be a diversion and cloaking were just a series of random events.
@Paul Onions said: Since this flight path is consistent with a standard diversion, then it would be highly likely that a standard diversion to Banda Aceh via Vampi-Mekar-Nilam-Sanob was programmed.
This and other things you keep repeating make no sense. Besides the fact that it makes no sense to pass Penang if there was a problem, there is no standard diversion to Banda Aceh via VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB. And your understanding of the HGA, LGA (which you omit), and the BFO is wrong.
@TimR: Welcome to the discussion.
In the past, you have promoted a scenario in which the opposition party was negotiating with Najib during the flight, based on information you obtained indirectly from a whistleblower. You have claimed that negotiators on the ground were unaware of what occurred to the plane after the plane took off at Kuala Lumpur. I have challenged you to produce more specific or verifiable information, or your information would have to be classified as unsubstantiated rumors, of which there are many for MH370.
Let’s put aside for now speculation that you and others may have about the sequence of events after takeoff. What additional information can you share regarding what you were told was the original plan of the captain and the negotiators?
I am not in a position to provide more information about the background details without unduly compromising the parties involved, I am sorry.
At this stage we can only use what we have to flesh out a scenario based on what we know may have happened if this outline was feasible.
So here goes. If you consider piloted flight throughout as a possibility, which I do, one would expect a competent pilot to use waypoints and straight tracks.
Captain Zaharie was a professional pilot, he would have used waypoints and let the aircraft do the flying.
The flight path round below Sumatra fits the BTO data from 19:41 through 00:11 with straight tracks at a steady speed using just three waypoints in the last 4.5 hours of flight and depending on altitude change towards the end of flight the BFO’s also fit.
It is possible MH370 ditched in an area between 8°S and 10°S near the 7th arc. There is an airfield less than 120nm from the southern end of the 7th arc and an airfield less than 80nm from the northern end of the 7th arc. What is hard to explain is running out of fuel within 100nm or so of a couple of airfields and no communication during the ditching.
@Victor. David Mearns obtained a deal of support from David Griffin of the CSIRO, who used his then-recent results of Western Australian researches for the Royal Australian Navy to establish currents retrospectively. Thence from German lifeboat positions Mearns was able to identify a search area for that ship, also sunk, where previously that and other evidence had been subject to much dispute. Having found that vessel and knowing from the Germans in what direction the mortally damaged Sydney was headed after the action, he was able to find her quickly. He had considerable support in Australia including from the RAN, for obvious reasons and from a previously established group of prominent business and ex Navy people.
He was particularly successful in persuading, analysing and organising.
After his success with the Sydney he would have a head start here and should have access to Government but I suspect in the first place his task would be to review the case for a new search. He would need to enter various undertakings to do that, since much information is confidential.
To me the most logical course for him would be to aim to increase confidence in a sensible search area and thence persuade the Governments to go ahead, receiving full support from Government sources, including funding, for doing this, since the distances, conditions and area speak cost and other resources.
What is needed still is that lift in confidence though that is not just a job for a salesman. The case must have substance.
Maybe he would find private funding but also he would need access to piles of information such as radar around the Malacca Strait, and other commercially owned, and more generally from Government. That includes not just the ATSB but at least as importantly, Malaysia. Then he would need both Boeing’s and MAS’s confidence. I think that would be an impossible undertaking without first obtaining both Malaysian and Australian Government support.
@TimR
You left out Mikhail P’s analysis which I reported on some time ago. I too have given up on that location for the reasons you state. The link to Mikhail’s work in my post below is still active. Quite a coincidence, actually.
http://tmex1.blogspot.com/2015/08/coincidences-are-you-believer-i-am.html
@Victor
The TV interview with David Mearns is very convincing as far as his qualifications. I hope something can be done. Sounds like he spends a lot of time planning where to search. He experience could be most helpful.
@TBill. “I am wondering if not cold soak, but rarefied air could change the heat up behavior, due to less heat transfer away from the unit.”
I throw in that less dense air will of course be less conductive generally, including during a cold soak. Likewise temperature rise will decrease it. Humidity has an effect also. Details are on the web.
Bear in mind that yet again there are more uncertainties. The SDU normally is cooled by a lavatory fan, 115VAC, right main bus of which there are two, one operating at a time. It had its own as a standby in case the others are inoperative, 115VAC, Left Sec 2. It depends then on what power is available as to which if any is operating. The lavatory fans can be load shed.
There are no thermostats shown so I assume they all are on full time once selected.
@David: In our meetings with David Mearns, we shared information on the seabed search status, satellite data, radar data, fuel models, navigation modes, and whatever other data we’ve been investigating and analyzing. However, I don’t think that much of that information is really required at this point to find the plane. The location of the 7th arc combined with the drift analyses is probably the best data we have, and that is mostly in the public domain. I’m sure he will be working closely with David Griffin and other drift modelers to help define a new search zone.
@ Victor This extracted from the comments by David Mearns:
“When asked if they are looking the right place, he responded, “No, because they have not found it. When they look in the right place, they will find it. ….”
There have been several articles that postulate that the searchers could have missed the wreckage. Here is one of those: http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/search-methods-for-missing-malaysia-plane-criticized/
It is difficult to find anyone who will support such a view. Certainly, those who have spent the money won’t; nor will those have ‘earned’ the money. Those who have a theory that the wreckage lies outside the search area pleased to state that because the wreckage has not been found in the search area it could be found in ‘their’ search area.
It does seem there are factors that can affect the reliability of an underwater search – crew experience, equipment, sea states, sea floor topography, …. Indeed, I believe the search team on more than one occasion returned to a specific area to have another look – perhaps to scan along different lines, perhaps to scan with other equipment. This means that someone looking at the data had made a judgement call that the data at a location was indeterminate and required another look. It is possible that not all those ‘judgement calls’ were made correctly. That could result in a miss.
It would be interesting to know if anyone took steps to ‘ground truth’ the search. For example, someone could have secretly thrown of old engine or landing gear strut into the sea a week or so head of the search vessel and the wait to see if they found it.
I would be interested to know your view on the possibility of a miss.
> DrB says:
> @VictorI, You said: However, if there was a failure, we do know what pilots
> would do to save the crew and passengers. Flying past Penang makes no sense
> in that context.”
> That is your opinion, and on this we disagree. The PIC may have initially
> decided that the landing could be made more safely by first achieving
> functionality of safety-related equipment items (communications and TCAS).
> That was not yet achieved when Penang was passed.
> Victor Iannello says:
> @DrB: If a pilot decided an immediate landing was not feasible as he passed
> a very suitable airport, he would stay close to the airport, descend, and
> circle, not continue flying away from it at cruise altitude. […] It’s also
> what makes sense. There would be no guarantee that the next airport could
> be reached. Banda Aceh is over 290 NM from Penang.
I remember an in-flight technical failure incident, in which the pilots chose to avoid any turns until they had a good idea of the whole situation, thus getting further and further away from the nearest airport. I believe it was Quantas flight 32.
QF32 is sort of halfway between your 2 scenarios quoted above.
Could MH370 have been a QF32-type scenario with lost comms and which somehow deteriorated over time so that the “FMT” was actually an unsuccessful/incomplete attempt of a turn-back to Penang ?
@Victor
Why pass Penang?
The mind does crazy things when it is being deprived of oxygen.
I think you need to:
1. Research symptoms of hypoxia and previous flights like Kalitta 66, Helios 522, Paine Stewart’s Lear Jet, VH-SKC
2. Learn what the Left AIMS cabinet does.
3. Research how you can’t turn off the Mode S portion of transponder from cockpit, but still have it transmit.
4. Learn some basic aviation knowledge.
@Dr B. “Can you envision a scenario where the APU would auto-start and run from 17:22 to ~18:25, but then shut down until MEFE occurred when it would auto-start again?”
It would auto-start only on loss of AC power from both transfer buses. With both engines running I now think this could occur only if the MEC had been wrecked, when one can presume the APU would be electrically protected and remain off line anyway. Above 22,000ft it would not deliver compressed air to the pneumatic system for pressurisation either.
I cannot see what would prompt it to cut out autonomously after an hour other than a defect. As to whether power restoration would do that the AMM does not make that clear. There is a diagram (49-40-00 p19) suggesting that start logic is responsive just to AC power loss and to the APU selector not being at ‘start’, but run logic is undisclosed. However turning off the APU after an auto-start, manned, requires the switch to be turned from ‘off’ to ‘on’ then back. There is no mention of an auto-stop and obviously having no pilot is not foreshadowed so I doubt there would be such a logic. In other words I infer it would keep running, unmanned, even were power restored.
Were it manually selected off I believe it could auto-start again later so long as it had stopped beforehand. Its run down cooling cycle at altitude will take about 3 mins. APU start uses engine bleed air when available despite my talk of battery capacity yesterday.
By the way, an auto-start entails RAT deployment which is irreversible in the air so it would be down for the duration. There are two RAT auto-extension solenoids, one actuated by the ELMS on AC failure, the other on hydraulic failure (AMM 29-20-00 p21). That might affect your fuel calcs; but anyway the aircraft would be wandering without far to go, being without autopilot, that is unless it had a pilot.
@Victor. AMM 49-40-00 p17 makes it clear, consistent with the above, that the RAT will deploy during APU auto-start, which rules out any delay after FE while hydraulic accumulators keep up pressure. Taken literally this means that since RAT deployment causes roll that will not be the same as roll from flaperon asymmetry. The latter should arise only after the accumulators run down and I cast back to your simulation. That reopens the possibility that the two are additive contributors to roll?
@Paul Onions: I try to allow a variety of opinions here, but this is not a website where you can throw about incorrect statements. You said many. I referenced some. Here’s another. The IFE head is not load shed.
@Peter Norton: In Qantas Flight 32, the plane was over Batam Island, Indonesia, when an uncontained engine failure causes multiple failures to other systems, including one hydraulic system, flight control surfaces, and engine controls. It took 50 minutes for the pilots to assess the damage and plan a course of action. During that time, the plane flew a racetrack pattern near Singapore Changi Airport. This is what pilots in an emergency situation would be expected to do: stay close to a suitable airport until landing at that airport is possible. (The distance from Batam Island to Changi is only about 17 NM.)
@David: It will be very difficult to determine what caused the roll to begin when we believe it did. We identified some possible contributors to the high roll rate, including flaperon asymmetry and engine restarts. I’m not sure we can do more than that. It’s also possible there was a commanded nose down. Since any of these scenarios results in an impact close to the 7th arc, I’m not sure it matters.
All,
I have added a new figure to my most recent document that might be of interest. The ATPL workbook provides enough information that one can create a crude version of the AERO figure for a range of weights at cruise altitude for the 777-300ER. Although not correct quantitative for 9M-MRO, it gives a qualitative feel for how the shape of the fuel efficiency curve changes with weight.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/14hleZyx1pUPL44yaeHKt6jnSQ3DbgRq2zibbKkFLq2c/edit?pref=2&pli=1
@Dennis
Ami is working you too hard.
I’m grateful, indeed honored to be in receipt of your pity. However, I can tell when a man is on the ropes and as I am rather short on the killer instinct these days, I will respectfully back off.
Best wishes, Rob 🙂
@Victor
Although I greatly appreciate David Mearns offer to help find the aircraft, this is a controversial accident that neither Malaysia nor Boeing may be interested in publicly disclosing the cause (which I personally presume to be rouge pilot diversion, possibly with some disturbing deeds along the flight). My perception is that international (ICAO) guidelines give ownership of the data to the responsible country (Malaysia). Therefore the responsible country probably has the ability to control public spin, data release, and definition of likely cause as they see fit. And we know smaller countries (eg; Egypt, Singapore, etc) are very reluctant to accept “rouge pilot” as a cause, to put it mildly.
The assumption (from the Mearn’s TV interview) is that the public has the right-to-know the cause of this tragedy. But I am not sure international law gives the public that right-to-know.
@TBill
While I too appreciate Mearns’ interest, I think the likelihood of a search based on private funding (even including corporations under the “private” label) is extremely low.
In other news:
“Circumstances that brought down flight MH370 in March 2014 remain a mystery, but scientific advances should yield some breakthroughs in three to four years, Malaysia Airlines CEO Peter Bellew said.”
I wonder if we will still be at it in three to four years. Perhaps Bellew was referring to improvements in search technology. Actually, my own interest is shifting in that direction.
@ROB
“I’m grateful, indeed honored to be in receipt of your pity.”
Actually, I was looking for pity from you. No matter. It is all good.
@TBill
As you point out the ICAO publishes guidelines, or more specifically, recommendations. It is the responsibility of member states’ aviation regulator (e.g. UK-CAA, US-FAA, MY-DCA) to set out and enforce the administrative framework in each country. The regulator is typically a agency of government subordinate to the department of transport.
The ICAO recommendation is that the air accident investigation body should be separate and independent of the regulator.
Malaysia did not institute its independent air accident investigation bureau until 2015. Any significant statements concerning the investigation of MH370’s loss continue to be attributed to the contrivance known as “The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370” and published at mot.gov.my (Ministry of Transport).
There is no international law concerning a ‘right to know’, international law requires treaties, conventions, and the like. The public can rely only on the diligence and transparency that is representative of the state whose institutions conduct the investigation.
A successful MH370 deep ocean search will only determine the location of the wreckage, and, possibly, record the extent of the debris field with sonar or visual imaging as per Phase V of the BEA search for AF447.
Responsibilty for the recovery and detailed investigation of that evidence remains the responsibility of the MICAOA13SITfMH370.
@all: for how long does data tend to remain recoverable from a FDR, when at the bottom of a deep ocean?
Seeking links to published empirical data.
Was once told “~ two years” was mildly optimistic.
@sk999,
Unless I am missing something, the 300ER document you sent me the link to does not include any MRC table. It does have a speed table for CI=0, but no fuel flow data.
Where did you get the MRC fuel flow data?
Further to the motive outlined earlier the need to know about the informant and background information was not particularly necessary.
There was an understanding that only if successful negotiations were finalised would Captain Zaharie be notified while airborne. This would keep disclosure to a minimum.
Due to the negotiations being unsuccessful there was no contact with MH370.
We don’t know what actually happened but we do know what was intended to happen.
Captain Zaharie intended, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, to land in Indonesia, release the passengers and put himself at the mercy of the Indonesian authorities.
I want to emphasize once more that I am not 100% certain, that the incident I am referring to is QF32, but here is QF32’s flight trajectory:
http://avherald.com/img/qantas_a388_vh-oqa_singapore_101104_map2.jpg
(purple rectangle is where the engine failure occured)
The point I was trying to make is that the pilots did not turn back immediately after the failure occured, but continued level flight until they understood the situation well enough from a technical point of view. (Only at that point did they turn back and enter a holding pattern.)
Maybe MH370’s flight through the Malacca Straight occured for the same reason.
Ok, for argument’s sake let’s add lost comms to the failure list (for MH370).
The checklists alone took 50 minutes. ¹ All in all, it took about 2 hours to land (they needed that much time to diagnose the problem, strategize, plan the course of action, and finally prepare the landing).
Theory:
Maybe when turning back at IGARI, MH370 pilots initially wanted to land at Penang but had not yet finished those 2 items (damage assessment/checklist rundown + planning) when reaching Penang. Hence no landing attempt.
Maybe that was Z’s intent.
Oleksandr: ²
Oleksandr: ³
I am not advocating, just offering some ideas.
—
¹ http://avherald.com/h?article=43309c6d
² http://j.mp/2tStlo5
³ http://j.mp/2tT3Wug
@Brock
“@all: for how long does data tend to remain recoverable from a FDR, when at the bottom of a deep ocean?”
I see you have been flooded with answers… (ha, ha)
That is a very difficult question to answer, and one which the manufacturers of various SSD’s don’t publish a lot of data on. Retention depends on the storage temperature, the use temperature, and how much the medium has been used. We can estimate the first two at 5C and 40C respectively. The use question is hard to quantify. My guess is that your two year number is about right at room temperature storage and that 4-6 years might be expected at 5C (bottom of the ocean). It is a concern.
@Peter Norton: For QF32, the turn back towards Changi occurred about 34 NM after the failure. If a failure occurred on MH370, it occurred after passing IGARI, when the transponder stopped, communications stopped, and the plane turned back. It would make no sense to travel 223 NM to Penang, and then pass it up for Banda Aceh, which is another 292 NM away. If the pilot felt it was necessary to dump fuel, he would have done that while holding near Penang. Or he could have landed heavy, which is always an option.
@TimR said: Further to the motive outlined earlier the need to know about the informant and background information was not particularly necessary.
It is necessary if the informant would like this claim to be taken seriously. Otherwise, it will be put in the same bin as other wild assertions that have been offered with no proof. Why an informant would sincerely offer something without enough information for it to be taken serious is very odd.
@Victor
TimR is wasting your’s and everyones time.
Anger, rage and embitterment: What motivate a mass murderer. Copy and paste: For those interested in the ‘fantasy and brooding’ periods…and the final proverbial straw. And one can only begin to guess what pressure was being exerted on Zaharie from the BN/UMNO govt. apparatus using MAS as a vehicle of punitive payback.
Embitterment builds over time, turning toxic and pathological, and frequently manifests in fantasies, sometimes intrusive, obsessive and unwanted fantasies, of exacting revenge on those perceived to be to blame for one’s problems. When the anger, rage, resentment and embitterment grow wild, unchecked or ignored, vengeful, murderous fantasies turn into reality. It is highly likely, and indicated by the premeditation present in both of these sad cases, that such fantasies and murderous impulses preceded their heinous enactment. There is almost always some “final straw,” some perceived blow not necessarily apparent to others, that sets the mass murderer off. Some spark that ignites the powder keg. In the case of Mr. Dekraai, the course of the custody battle not going in his favor could have been the catalyst. But only because the embitterment and fury had festered for so long.
This dangerous state of mind may be partially likened to what is traditionally known in Malaysia as “running amok.” During the incubatory stage of this amok syndrome, as described in the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV-TR, the perpetrator, almost always male, goes through a “period of brooding followed by an outburst of violent, aggressive or homicidal behavior.” In some, but not most cases of mass murder, as with the amok syndrome, the violence can signal the presence of psychosis, and is typically followed by a return to “normalcy” and full or partial amnesia for the event. Significantly, the amok syndrome “tends to be precipitated by a perceived slight or insult.” This is really the key to understanding what motivates such evil deeds. The perpetrator has been somehow hurt, psychologically wounded, figuratively castrated, insulted, disrespected, rejected, traumatized, humiliated or defeated in some way, and seeks, at least unconsciously, revenge and retaliation. This primitive “talionic response” is fueled by festering rage, anger, resentment and bitterness, which, when denied, dissociated, repressed or chronically masked, becomes pathological and potentially destructive. (Pre-existing pathological narcissism or what I have referred to as “psychopathic narcissism” certainly makes one more susceptible, though we all suffer from some narcissistic vulnerability.) It is a narcissistic need to win at all costs. To right a perceived wrong. To exert what little control, dignity, freedom and power one feels one has left by lashing out at others or the world. And, in some cases, such as the numerous school shootings in recent decades or the recent cases of Anders Breivik in Norway (see my prior post) or Jared Lee Loughner in Arizona (see my prior post), it is motivated by what I call a “wicked rage for recognition.” (See my prior post.) However, whereas Loughner, Ted “Unambomber” Kaczynski (see my prior post), possibly Breivik and many other violent offenders who “run amok” are subsequently diagnosed with Schizophrenia, Dissociative Disorder, Bipolar Disorder or some severe personality disorder, most are not psychotic, and certainly do not meet the criteria for legal insanity. They are mad, angry, resentful, embittered. But not necessarily mentally ill. Or, maybe more accurately, it is their raging pathological embitterment, their underlying anger disorder (see my prior post) that makes them mentally “ill” and motivates their violent behavior, rather than vice-versa.
Link to article if interested: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evil-deeds/201110/anger-rage-and-pathological-embitterment-what-motivates-mass-murders
Which statements are incorrect?
My information is sourced from appropriate reference manuals.
If you think they’re wrong, write to the appropriate manufacturer to get them to change their reference manuals so it suits your theory.
Bobby Ulich,
LRC mileage is .99 of MRC, so just invert.
@Peter Norton
Re: Fuel Load
One aspect you get a feel for using Microsoft flight simulator B777 model is how little fuel was on MH370 compared to the total capacity of the fuel tanks. According to Richard Godfrey’s paper “The Long Hunt for a Diversion Airport” MH370 should have been marginally within allowable landing weight by the time it got to Penang.
@Paul Onions:
You asked which of your statements are incorrect? Here are some that either are wrong or are not supported by evidence. Some of what you claim was already debunked when “Captain_Ripari” presented very similar arguments in a reddit thread, and knowledgeable people like Don Thompson and Mike Exner tried to correct the errors. Similar statements have also appeared on Twitter under the handle @PeteNoetic.
1. You claim that “a standard diversion to Banda Aceh via Vampi-Mekar-Nilam-Sanob was programmed.” There is no standard diversion to WITT that includes those waypoints. The STARS start at waypoints ANOKO, ANSAX, BEDAX, DUAMO, JILAT, and MOSOL.
2. You claim the “1825 log on is caused automatically when the Right High Gain Antenna (mounted on right side of fuselage) is finally exposed to the satellite when the aircraft turns left at Nilam, since the Left High Gain Antenna is inoperative.” The left and right arrays to the HGA are part of the same system and powered by the same source. If the HGA was inoperative, the low gain antenna (LGA) can be used.
3. You claim “the damage to the Left AIMS cabinet (which contains the modules for the Satellite Data Unit) is the cause of the abnormal BFOs.” In fact, there are not dedicated modules for the SATCOM in the AIMS. The inertial data that is used for the Doppler pre-compensation is supplied over ARINC 429 bus. If there was no inertial data, the SATCOM would not transmit.
4. You claim the “IFE can be load shed by the ELMS”. You fail to understand, even though it was explained to you by @Andrew, that the IFE head is not among the IFE equipment that is shed by ELMS.
5. You claim that “if [the ATSB] released the Indonesian Radar, it would show MH370 flying over Banda Aceh”. There is no evidence for this.
6. You claim that “if they released the FOs phone log, it would show it connected to Banda Aceh at 1837.” Again, there is no evidence for this.
7. You claim that “if they released the Vietnamese Air Traffic Control transcript, it would show MH88 reporting that they heard static from MH370 on the emergency radio frequency.” Again, there is no evidence for this.
8. You claim that “if they released the playback of the Malaysian Secondary Surveillance Radar, it would show a coasting period of Mode S prior to 1720:36.” Again, there is no evidence for this.
9. You claim that “if they released the fuel report, it would show that the estimate for the fuel remaining at Igari was too low.” Again, there is no evidence for this.
10. You claim “the transfer of power to the Left Main AC bus from the failing Left IDG to APU causes a significant power interruption to the Satcom when the left engine spools down.” This is wrong. The bus capacitance of the SATCOM by design is sufficient to ride through a transfer of power. Your “proof” of the power interruption is an FSX PMDG 777 simulation. I have explained that this simulation is not to be trusted to properly model the timing of events that occur during a sub-second interval.
11. You claim the “BFO at 0019:37 should be discounted (according to Inmarsat).” You are citing a paper written in Oct 2014. In fact, the current analysis by Ian Holland of the DSTG, with cooperation from Inmarsat, says that the two last BFOs indicate that MH370 was in a steep descent.
@Victor. Re when RAT causes roll. You commented in part, “….I’m not sure it matters.”
I will not pursue it though that is because my premise was ill-founded.
@Donald. Thank you for describing the characteristics of some mental ailments which could be relevant.
You say, “..one can only begin to guess what pressure was being exerted on Zaharie from the BN/UMNO govt.
I think you need to relate specific Zaharie symptoms with those, such as, “…raging pathological embitterment”.
@Donald. Second last line should read, “..those characteristics, such as..”
@TimR, ‘Captain Zaharie intended, regardless of the outcome, to land in Indonesia’
ZS must have been pretty buggered that he ran out of fuel. Tiny oversight in this elaborately planned negotiation.
@Irthe Turner
“ZS must have been pretty buggered that he ran out of fuel. Tiny oversight in this elaborately planned negotiation.”
There is that issue coupled with accurate fuel remaining instrumentation.
Additionally no communication to give the PAX and crew a fighting chance at recovery.
Of course, the points on Shah’s simulator do not resonate with an Indonesian landing plan.
@sk999,
Thanks for the tip on calculating MRC fuel flow using the ATPL for the 300ER. Now if we could only get a similar set of tables for the 200ER.
@DennisW, re: ’ of course the points on Shah’s simulator do not resonate with an Indonesian landig plan’
And if I may humbly add to that, lack of debris washing up on Indonesian shores also demostrates that the aircraft did not go down off the coast of Indonesia. Perhaps Mr. Gibson packed them up and planted them over yonder. Funny shit. 🙂
@TBill: thank you, good point
@Victor Iannello: “he would have done that while holding near Penang”
Maybe Z wanted to avoid any turns (like QF32 before holding) ?
I’m looking forward to whether DrB will comment.
@Donald, re: your post above and article.
Absolutely fascinating and thank you for posting. What are your thoughts on ZS needing to conceal his actions? He hid did it for a reason.
@Donald
Re: “And one can only begin to guess what pressure was being exerted on Zaharie from the BN/UMNO govt. apparatus using MAS as a vehicle of punitive payback.”
Is there any evidence that any pressure was being exerted on Captain Zaharie by the Government or by MAS? Any evidence of “punitive payback“? Any evidence that MAS’s management of Captain Zaharie was unfair?
Here’s one more article on ‘pseudocommando’ mass murderers. IMO this is quite representative of Zaharie, with some notable anomalies (perhaps).
This isn quite fascinating; http://jaapl.org/content/38/1/87.long
@Mick Gilbert
Who knows? sure Malaysia would be more than transparent about any disciplinary actions? LMAO. We know MAS and Z were used to manipulate vote counts…more on that later. And senior flight sim trainer flying the midnight to Beijing overnight? And if you know anything, anything at all, about Malay politics, given Z’s social media profile he would NOT have gone unpunished.
@Irthe turner
Great question. In my heart of hearts I believe that it was a ‘pseudo’ concealment. In that, he knew full well he would be looked upon as the prime suspect…and with that in mind (his mind), it gets interesting, very interesting. And very complex (and he was a complex man). I have many thoughts on this that I will share later.
@Donald
“And senior flight sim trainer flying the midnight to Beijing overnight?”
Are you suggesting that being rostered on to the MH370/371 pairing was some form of punishment?
“… given Z’s social media profile he would NOT have gone unpunished.”
But you have no evidence to support that contention, do you?
@TBill
@Peter Norton
RE: “According to Richard Godfrey’s paper “The Long Hunt for a Diversion Airport” MH370 should have been marginally within allowable landing weight by the time it got to Penang.”
Richard quotes the aircraft’s maximum landing weight as 213,180kg. That figure is quoted on several Internet sites, but according to the MAS 777-200ER FCOM and the Factual Information Report, the aircraft’s maximum landing weight is 208,652kg. The aircraft would have been more than 4,000 kg overweight at Richard’s estimated landing weight at Penang. Nevertheless, overweight landings are acceptable, subject to runway length and any malfunctions that might affect the aircraft’s stopping ability.
This would have enraged Z in and of itself.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-idUSBRE9410K620130502
As for no evidence, you are correct. Common sense and a knowledge of how things work (see above, for evidence to support contention, duh) in Malaysia couldn’t make for a more inescapable conclusion.
And it’s almost beside the point anyway. He loathed the govt. and it cronyism, came to despise MAS, hated the Chinese (you go and look at his fb posts, I’m done producing them for you), had recently shown and interest in Dawkins and nihilism (pertinent to mass murder tendency) etc…good night.
@Donald, Mick Gilbert.
Donald said, ““And senior flight sim trainer flying the midnight to Beijing overnight?”
Mick said, “Are you suggesting that being rostered on to the MH370/371 pairing was some form of punishment?”
Though unfamiliar with airline pilot training I offer this.
Of the Captain, FI says, “During this flight on the day of the event, he was conducting training for the First Officer who was operationally checked out.”
The FO had just 39 hours on type. Would it be unusual for a “Type Rating Instructor” such as the Captain (FI again) to be asked to conduct the training?
@David
Unfortunately, the (literally) friendliest human beings you may ever come across can be plagued with ‘raging pathological embitterment’. Only YOU would never know it. A wife, on the other hand, would know this all to well.
As for Z and this characteristic, it’s my opinion that he fits a profile of one who harbored such personalized injustice. His fb posts (which his defenders pathetically attempt to downplay and diminish in import) are pathological in so much as being inveterate, rabid and replete WITH expressions of inequity and injustice and the COMPULSION TO RIGHT THIS WRONG. Indeed, the DUTY to make right and punish the punishers.
Good night.
@David
RE: “The FO had just 39 hours on type. Would it be unusual for a “Type Rating Instructor” such as the Captain (FI again) to be asked to conduct the training?”
No!
@Peter Norton. You said of QF32, “All in all, it took about 2 hours to land (they needed that much time to diagnose the problem, strategize, plan the course of action, and finally prepare the landing).”
If perchance MH370 had a problem that was not simple to sort out, consider the possibility that resolving that could have taken much longer. QF32’s captain was training to be a check captain. Also in the cockpit were two check captains plus a first and a second officer. The others provided valuable advice to the captain, who otherwise might have made mistakes.
Furthermore the largest piece by far of the disintegrated engine turbine disc, travelling at high relative speed, did not hit the aircraft.
QF32 was in daytime. The cockpit conditions were benign.
In MH370, at night, possibly with smoke or mist, there were the experienced captain, an examiner, and one first officer under training.
Certainly the current weight of evidence is that with MH370 being navigated successfully subsequently while not descending, landing or communicating etc it is more likely that a serious materiel failure was not the cause; and evidently there had been no engine failure.
Irrespective of that, MH370 to me highlights this as a safety issue IMO. QF32 should be taken as a lesson as to the potential problems a one-experienced-pilot onboard policy can bring, particularly in a night flight, with weather other than benign and in an aircraft as complex as the 777 and with potential failures even more serious than QF32’s.
I have raised this earlier but the answer I got was that a fully trained captain would manage. To me though a QF32 lesson is that such manning should be disallowed.
@Andrew, you might not be free to offer a public opinion and in any case it is not directly relevant to the MH370 cause so far as we know. However a comment would be welcomed by me at least if you can and would.
@Donald. Thanks for your expansion. Goodnight.
@Andrew. Thanks for your earlier. I think that answers that.
@Andrew
Just for curiosities sake, roughly how many t7 type rating instructors would an airline of MAS size have at their disposal, scheduling aside?
And would the FO be required to share the cockpit with a t7 type rated instructor, or would ‘simply’ an experienced type rated non-instructor t7 pilot be adequate?
Though largely irrelevant in my book regardless!
@Donald
Re: “… you go and look at his fb posts, I’m done producing them for you) …”
You haven’t produced any of the Captain’s Facebook posts. When previously pressed on the matter of producing evidence of the Captain’s Facebook posts, this was your reply;
“Donald says:
July 21, 2017 at 3:13 am
It’s difficult to give an professional assessment when many of the man’s thoughts, words and deeds have ben mysteriously and surreptitiously stricken from the record.“
@Donald , re: ._.A wife would know this all too well.
Exactly. One cannot look through someones front door. His wife isn’t telling but something tells me she knows more.
There is so much that jumps off the pages of the pseudo commando article (which I had to read a couple of times), it’s mind boggling. It almost seems that 2 strains of revenge are at work here. The aggrieved victim with a shattered ego and intense feelings of rejection (the divorce?) and his perverse honor in refusing to normalize perceived injustice (MAS, MY government). With the planning of this heinous act, in his mind, would come fame which gave him an aura of power. Looking forward to your expert opinion regarding concealment (shield his children who he perceived to be victims like himself?). Good stuff Donald.
@Peter Norton. Post script. I could have added that QF32 also was not at high altitude. More generally there might be constraints on resolution of problems and planning by cockpit injuries and of time to do this by fuel, fire and by both cockpit and other injuries.
@Mick
They are there in 700+ posts. I produced numerous Ambang 13 posts. You go look for yourself. It’s tedious and you have zero inclination which is just beyond revealing as to your persuasions and lack of intellectual curiosity and objective analysis.
Stop playing games. Victor, if the man can’t bother to look for himself after 3 years, well, I just don’t know what conclusion one can draw other than something very untoward. I’ll refrain from what i really believe you to be.
You is in reference to ‘Mick’, whose objectivity is a laughingstock imho.
@Mick
You said “You haven’t produced any of the Captain’s Facebook posts.”
BOLDFACED LIE.
Paul Allen had found two sunken WW2 warships.
RE: “Just for curiosities sake, roughly how many t7 type rating instructors would an airline of MAS size have at their disposal, scheduling aside?”
Hard to say, but where I work we have 107 training captains for 70 aircraft, call it 1.5 per aircraft. I think Malaysian had 15 B777s, so at a guess they would have had somewhere around 22-25 training captains.
“And would the FO be required to share the cockpit with a t7 type rated instructor, or would ‘simply’ an experienced type rated non-instructor t7 pilot be adequate?”
During line training the FO is required to fly with a training captain in the other seat. According to the FI, the FO on MH370 was “operating his last training flight before he was scheduled to be checked out on his next scheduled flight”.
@Donald, @Mick Gilbert: You’ve both made your points. Calm down.
Regarding Facebook posts, they are incriminating but prove nothing definitively. To put either too much or too little weight on them is wrong.
@Victor
With regards to depowering the Left AC Bus in order to shut down the SATCOM, I mentioned the CVR because (and correct me if I am wrong) you had previously argued that the depowering of the SATCOM was (possibly?) a secondary outcome to the perpetrator’s real intention which was to shut down the CVR. I can recall pointing out that defeating the CVR could be accomplished with some chewing gum.
I am more than happy to agree with you that if depowering the SATCOM was the perpetrator’s intention then it could be accomplished in two steps; 1. Selecting the Left Bus Tie Breaker to ISLN, 2. Selecting the Left Generator to OFF.
Just so it is clear to me are you now saying that you believe that depowering the SATCOM by depowering the Left AC Bus was the perpetrator’s intention?
If that is the case, it raises the question of why the SATCOM was subsequently repowered. If the plan was to power down the whole SATCOM by depowering the Left AC Bus, wouldn’t/shouldn’t there have been a reasonable expectation that restoring power would initiate a log-on sequence?
Regarding Lido, yes, I have looked at the slide you’ve offered and it is, at best, inconclusive. I have also looked at this slide – http://mh370.radiantphysics.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/LidoImageTimestamps.png – which is somewhat clearer. Now my eyes aren’t what they used to be but, if airway N571 is the dashed line then it looks like very few of the radar plots fall right on it and the majority of the plots fall to the south of it.
To be clear, I am not saying that Lido definitely does not show a target navigating along N571, what I am saying is that whether it does show a target navigating along N571 is open to debate and is most assuredly not the only conclusion that one can draw.
@Mick Gilbert: In the past, I have listed many reasons why the left bus (and perhaps the left transfer bus) may have been isolated and then re-powered. Nobody can know the actual reason. However, with the release of the MH371 data, I am becoming increasingly confident that it occurred.
As for the Lido data, if you want to believe that the radar captures line up so close to N571 just by chance, I won’t argue with you. The slides are there for anybody to draw his or her own conclusions.
@TimR @all
The “new” data impacting the suggested 8-10S (Indonesia) crash zone is the improved understanding of the satellite zones (IOR and POR). Some here have suggested any crash zone further east of 105E is unlikely in consideration of that, but I am not sure that was a consensus/authoritative statement.
@Donald
Regarding the Captain’s Facebook posts, my apologies – you did provide a cut and paste of a number of “posts” on 22 July 2017; it contained one share from Tim Pardi of an Ambang 13 post and three shares by the Captain of Ambang 13 posts (that is from a total of 21 Ambang 13 shares on the Captain’s FB page).
I did not see your 22 July post, so again, my apologies for incorrectly contending that you hadn’t provided any.
@Donald,
In the RMP folder 1, pilot, the flights that ZS piloted are listed prior to March 8th. DPS (Denpasar, Bali) occurs very frequently as of February 2013. Does not seem a step up given you could almost label KUL-DPS as a domestic flight. @Andrew could perhaps shed some light whether this is normal practice given ZS training role and age.The Melbourne flight sticks out like a sore thumb. ZS daughter lived in Melbourne but why pilot this flight just 10 days prior to March 7th when he had not done so before?
@Irthe Turner
The Melbourne issue came up early on (perhaps still in 2014) relative to ZS funding of a property purchase by his daughter. It did not get much traction since spreadsheets were still the “rage” at that time. Probably just as well. That information (or a more consensus view on motive) do not seem to be of any help in refining the terminus.
@Dennis
The problem (or one of) from the get go has been the obsession with finding the terminus, thus aircraft. The presumption being that until this occurs, MH370 MUST remain a mystery. Bullocks. Rubbish. And a convenient manner in which to dismiss the entire body of overwhelmingly compelling circumstantial evidence.
@Irthe Turner
Very pertinent issues. If one looks at EVERYTHING and every task done from the perspective of Z, who was strongly and passionately at this point contemplating (imo dead set on ) mass murder/revenge suicide, things take on a vastly different interpretations and meanings. IMO this is how one must view his actions in the months prior to the flight on March 7th. As for the Melbourne flight, proper goodbyes would be a required action by Z. He was not a sociopath, and family had deep and profound meaning to him…imho.
@Mick
No worries, but why challenge me about Ambang 13 for example when you yourself have the data well in hand? You acted like their was little to no involvement and then produce something quite to the contrary…and he did attend multiple gatherings.
@Andrew
Thanks for your time and reply.
@Donald
“compelling circumstantial evidence”
FYI, “circumstantial” evidence is not held in high regard among the MH370 analytical community for some reason – even though finger prints and DNA are regarded as circumstantial evidence. Although I have never heard a defense attorney argue that his client’s finger prints on the murder weapon are irrelevant since his client’s finger prints are on all sorts of different objects.
Of the more than 300 people freed by the Innocence Project over 75% were convicted based on eye witness testimony (considered direct evidence).
@VictorI @all
You putting in a possible fighter jet from Butterworth as a second plane in the Lido-tracks (the other way around as I suggested) in a previous topic, is considered not ridiculous while no one knows what the Lido-tracks really represent.
Your (and @ALSM/others) persistent assumptions/convictions the plane must have nose dived near the 7th arc while you or no one else can know how long the assumed (only based on the 8 seconds BFO’s) steep descent lasted after 00:19 will imo diminish the possibility of succes by an effort of David Mearns.
Imo if you keep ruling out the possibility of a controlled steep descent, a final glide and ditch-like entry to the surface outside the 7th arc priority zones you keep dimishing the changes of succes of any new search-effort.
I repeat again; it seems to me you are just not willing to consider this possibility for one reason or another. While the debris is telling such an obvious story imo.
I wonder why this is. And why this is ignored by you and others.
And why I get ignored by stating my thoughts and doubts in this regard.
Is this telling of me who speaks up or about the ones who keep this issue silent?
@Ge Rijn: If David Mearns chooses to search based on the recommendations of David Griffin, he will search at 35S, which means he will be searching far from the 7th arc. I acknowledge that a controlled descent after a steep descent is possible, although I think it is less probable than an impact close to the 7th arc. We’re way past the point of anybody being certain of anything. I’m not sure what more you want me to say.
@Victor @Ge Rijn
What’s happening a little bit with David Mearns interest, is that some are lobbying for their flight path theories to be considered too. I feel that emotion. I see on Reddit that @pigdead made an argument for Mearns consideration, basically for the McMurdo path end point, which he feels is consistent with the Curtin undersea sound recording.
All,
The optimal Mach for a particular Cost Index is a balance between fuel costs and other operating costs, and as such the balance is achieved at the Mach number where the marginal costs are equal. What that means is that Cost Index measures the slope of the AERO mpg curve at the optimal Mach. The table on page 1-12 of the ATPL workbook gives Mach v. Cost Index for a range of both Cost Index values and masses. All one needs to do is numerically integrate the values in that table for a particular mass, normalize to the Cost Index 50 table, and out pops a customized AERO diagram for any weight for a B77-3300ER at FL350 covering the range MRC up to Cost Index 150 or 200 (where I stopped.) As a bonus, one can independently predict the LRC Mach and MPG values. I have added a figure showing those curves to my latest report. The fuel model I have been using is OK up to about LRC, but predicts higher fuel efficiency than is actual achieved for higher speeds.
@Ge Rijn
No one is going to resume an underwater search. Mearns’ statements are pure drivel i.e. the plane has not been found because people have been looking in the wrong place theme. Expert opinion? Wow, thanks a lot David, I never thought of that. Mearns has no clue where the plane terminated.
I would not lose any sleep over your perception of how your opinions are regarded. We are all in the same boat relative to that. As we deserve to be.
@TBill: I think the days of using path reconstructions to find the impact point are long gone. The new search will be along the 7th arc at a latitude determined by the drift data. The end-of-flight scenarios can help determine how far from the 7th arc to extend the search.
@Victor
“@TBill: I think the days of using path reconstructions to find the impact point are long gone. The new search will be along the 7th arc at a latitude determined by the drift data. The end-of-flight scenarios can help determine how far from the 7th arc to extend the search.”
Totally agree.
@Ge Rijn
Spot on. When considering how (glide, uncontrolled descent, controlled descent, controlled steep descent and subsequent pull out…and angle of entry into water) the airplane impacted the water, unless you are of unicorns and glass slippers, the ONLY worthy consideration and contemplation is to figure out Z’s motive and preferred outcome…once this can be sufficiently established (a difficult but not impossible deduction), we then have an EOF flight scenario that reveals itself assuming it remains consistent with the debris.
The BFO tells us that the plane was deliberately put into a steep dive, period. The next questions are fairly obvious. Did he, or did he not, pull out of this dive. The idea that he wasn’t alive and in control at this point in the flight is ludicrous.
Leaving aside the wide variety of debris interpretation (are we still going on about ‘flutter’??? Sad.), the clear implication is that Z would have demanded he maintain control of the airplane through impact, whether dive or glide….although there is anecdotal evidence (you tube videos, paragliding history, water landings with model planes, pby catalina video) that glide and low to medium energy impact occurred.
Control, control, control…the act of mass murder is about regaining control and utilizing the weapons at hand to exact the most fantastical and devastating revenge possible (according to the mind and logic of the perpetrator).
People want to bring up the suicidal aspect (assuming deliberate action), and that certainly warrants further discussion, but this was first and foremost a slaughter of innocent human beings, no matter how you slice it.
I’ll exit by simply saying that the chances of Z ‘nosediving’ into the SIO as his preferred EOF scenario are somewhere close to none. Whether he pulled out, tried to fly inverted, attempted loops etc…who knows.
But Tbill is right about one (well, many) thing for certain…he had a target in mind (Rob is keen on this as well, I believe) and it wasn’t just any old SIO terminus. There’s a clue out there somewhere.
@Irthe Turner
RE: “DPS (Denpasar, Bali) occurs very frequently as of February 2013…@Andrew could perhaps shed some light whether this is normal practice given ZS training role and age.The Melbourne flight sticks out like a sore thumb. ZS daughter lived in Melbourne but why pilot this flight just 10 days prior to March 7th when he had not done so before?”
I don’t think there was necessarily anything untoward with the rostering of the DPS flights. Airlines do a lot of their pilots’ line checks on shorter flights. KUL-DPS vv would be a good candidate as the check could be completed in one day, freeing up the check captain for other duties. Z may have been rostered for more DPS flights during that period simply because the airline had more trainees coming through the system.
The MEL flight might be unusual, but then again it could simply be coincidence. Perhaps it was a requested flight because he hadn’t seen his daughter for some time and didn’t get to go to MEL very often in his training/checking role. That doesn’t necessarily mean it was a ‘goodbye’ trip, but it obviously doesn’t rule it out either.
@Irthe Turner
@Andrew
Regarding the Captain’s rostering, the Melbourne flight (MH149) probably stands out because up until 20 November 2013 Malaysia Airlines had been operating their A330-300s on the MH149/148 route. It is perhaps worth noting that Captain Zaharie was rostered to fly to Melbourne again on MH149 on 29 March 2014 so the 26 February flight was not a one-off.
You might have also noticed that up until late March 2013 the Captain used to fly to Sydney fairly regularly on either MH123 or MH141; in April 2013 MAS started using their A330-300s on that route in lieu of their B777-200ERs.
@Mick Gilbert
Thanks Mick – that would explain it!
@Victor
“I think the days of using path reconstructions to find the impact point are long gone. The new search will be along the 7th arc at a latitude determined by the drift data. The end-of-flight scenarios can help determine how far from the 7th arc to extend the search.”
Is that what you told him? Not sure I agree (not kidding…but you could well be ahead of me). But I am just saying there is generic jealousy about getting theories to Mearns, be it crash scenario or flight paths or whatever.
Victor- I am highly appreciative of your MH370 work. If it wasn’t for you thinking a lot like me, but way better, I don’t know what I’d do.
@Donald “The problem (or one of) from the get go has been the obsession with finding the terminus, thus aircraft.”
I’m speaking for myself only, but I suspect I’m not alone here in the following:
It would be uncharitable for me to call you a troll, but honestly, your perspective — claiming to prove a crime from remote viewing of the alleged perpetrator, is far from the perspective that most of us share. I’d futher guess that 80% of the regular commenters, if pressed, would agree that this was a PIC-directed crash, and that ZS was the most likely suspect. But few of us find youor profiling of ZS very helpful. NOr your rather strident response to any criticism.
Further I find it hard to believe that a mental health professional would be so sure of diagnosis from the types of sources you use.
There’s a very good reason that the main US psychological societies follow some version of the “Goldwater rule” — that such profiling is likely to be cherry-picked or driven by the profiler’s preconceived notions.
IMO, until the wreckage is located, we have little to be certain about, nor lacking this, it’s almost certain there never will be a smoking gun that indicts ZS, any other perpetrator, or for that matter, a particular cascade of mechanical failure.
@Andrew ,
Thank you for your time in explaining!
@Mick, Thanks. Where could I find the roster for flights after March 7? It’s not important but am curious. Appreciate it.
@DennisW , RE: ‘consensus view of motive do not seem to be any help in refining the terminus ‘
Very true. I do believe that in trying to better understand motive and the PIC actions we may unearth important clues. @Donald said’ there is a clue out there somewhere’, and this has also been my point of view for a very long time. ZS, IMHO was cocky enough to have chosen a very specific terminus, for example his DoB, 31.71s 96.1e or something else.
One day an unsuspecting fisherman, thinking he must have caught a larger-than-life tuna, will drag up an engine or something else.
@Ikr
You said “IMO, until the wreckage is located, we have little to be certain about”.
I would most strongly disagree with this notion, but it seems to be a persistent refrain with those determined not to finger point or lose a feigned neutrality. Although I do find it odd (and anything but charitable vis a vis the NOK who are still befuddled beyond imagination), as you yourself say that “I’d further guess that 80% of the regular commenters, if pressed, would agree that this was a PIC-directed crash, and that ZS was the most likely suspect.”
Regardless, and irrespective of what you think about my NON-DIAGNOSIS, the fact remains that too little time and effort has been spent digging into the background of this man. It really deserves to be the sole focus of the conversation…but we know there are too many ‘trolls’ and plants who want to steer the conversation into inane and irrelevant discourse. As happens every time we start to reveal on public forums some of the more troublesome and disturbing aspects of Zaharie’s personality. The challenges begin, ‘goldwater rules’ emerge, doubt is eagerly injected and on it goes.
It’s already proven for me, and I’m entitled to this absolute belief and conviction. What is most critical (and seems pretty damn logical and obvious) is to understand the cause and work towards future prevention.
Chasing ghost cascading electronic failures emanating from a coffee spill on the pedestal, or hypoxic fairy tail fictions due to a wheel well explosions advances us exactly nowhere. What a waste of time.
@Irthe Turner
” ZS, IMHO was cocky enough to have chosen a very specific terminus, for example his DoB, 31.71s 96.1e or something else.”
Yep. Could be broken ridge or whatever, but I’d agree with your premonition about specificity. It will be a very specific pre-determined site. As for big tuna’s, funny shit.
I’m positive he has told us cryptically where the plane is.
@Irthe Turner
You’re more than welcome.
The Captain’s roster to the end of March 2014 can be found on the 49th page of the leaked RMP report, Folder 1 Pilot. Subsequent to MH370/371 the Captain was rostered to fly KUL-DPS-KUL on 11 March, KUL-HKG-KUL on 13 March, KUL-AMS-KUL on 20/22 March and KUL-MEL-KUL on 29/31 March.
@Donald. From your response to Ikr.
“It’s already proven for me, and I’m entitled to this absolute belief and conviction. What is most critical (and seems pretty damn logical and obvious) is to understand the cause and work towards future prevention.”
As you would have it that the cause is established. It follows I think that investigation and the search can now cease. Is that what you would propose?
But leaving that aside, some attention has been paid already to suicide prevention after earlier examples, putative and otherwise. You characterise this more as homicide as I understand you though neither apparently lends itself to symptoms which can be detected by screening.
So future prevention would have to come from another source, or is that more research could be done to improve the potential of screening?
@TBill: David Mearns is going to get input from a lot of people, assess the data, and decide for himself where to search. It’s no secret that both he and the ATSB hold the work of David Griffin in high regard, so that location (35S latitude) would be my guess as to what gets searched first, whether the search be privately or government funded. There are reasons to question this location, but there are reasons to question any other location, too. I think we’ll know more after the ATSB releases its next report.
@all
Dumb question, so keep the flames down.
On page 29 of “Bayesian Methods…” the authors make the following statement:
“The compensation also assumes a motionless satellite at its nominal satellite location of 64.5◦E. The satellite altitude used in the correction is 422 km higher than the nominal 35788.12 km value.”
Is the 35788.12 km nominal position correct, and the AES is using 36210.12 km for the compensation calculation? Or is the true nominal value actually 36210.12 km?
@Dennis: The radius for any geosynchronous satellite in circular orbit is 42,164 km, or a height of 35,786 km (not 35,788 km…DSTG typo?) above sea level, with an equatorial earth radius of 6,378 km. I don’t know why the SATCOM Doppler pre-compensation algorithm assumes the altitude is 422 km higher.
@Victor
Thx. I told you it was a dumb question.
There does seem to be some variation in published values for the earth’s equatorial radius.
@Victor
Why anyone would use satellite altitude above the earth’s surface is bizarre in any case. Who cares?
@DennisW: Think equatorial radius is known to within several meters. That’s not a lot of variation.
@Victor
Conventions can be bewildering. The GPS reference ellipsoid has MSL at a negative value (mostly). I am not even sure what is meant by mean earth radius. Of course, there are hundreds of local datums. Your value of 6378 km is the WGS-84 ellipsoid value at the equator.
@Donald
“It’s already proven for me, and I’m entitled to this absolute belief and conviction. What is most critical (and seems pretty damn logical and obvious) is to understand the cause and work towards future prevention.”
It does not really matter if we prove that the pilot did it, because we have have already proved the pilot could have done it, including intentional depressuring. Part of the problem is that the airline industry (Boeing etc) wants to hold to current design practices of allowing (rouge) pilots to unilaterally turn everything on the aircraft off. To quote another author, it is almost inconceivable post 9/11 that pilots can still clandestinely turn off the transponders in flight.
I believe Z saw that he could out-smart the system, and was tempted to try it. Part of the issue is to improve pilot screening, but the the other part of the issue is to assume humans by nature will sometimes go haywire, and therefore don’t make it so darn easy for a rouge pilot to divert, ditch or depressure an aircraft. It seems easy to me to have electronic interlocks to prevent or at least discourage some the actions that probably took place in MH370.
Why should the flight computer allow a pilot to depressurize the aircraft in mid-flight, without even a distress signal?
@Mick Gilbert
You were discussing with Victor the question of the LH AC bus isolation as a method of depowering the SATCOM. You said “If that is the case, it raises the question of why the SATCOM was subsequently repowered. If the plan was to power down the whole SATCOM by depowering the Left AC Bus, wouldn’t/shouldn’t there have been a reasonable expectation that restoring power would initiate a log-on sequence?”. I’m sure that is indeed what Shah expected. The log-on occurring only minutes after he flew out of radar range (he must have estimated beforehand, when this would happen) cannot be a coincidence of timing imo. It had one of two possible purposes. Although he must have known that the log-on wouldn’t be observed in real time by MAS, I think he either 1)intended it to send the signal he had got beyond the reach of primary radar and had successfully avoided being tracked in real time (not difficult to do, considering their state of readiness) as a taunt to MAS and government, or 2) isolated the SATCOM until he was out of radar reach, to make MAS think the plane had suffered a catastrophic accident and crashed in the South China Sea. Possibly he did it for both reasons 1) and 2). The big point being that after 18:24, no one would be able to trace his flight path and his impact point, at least until after he had sunk the plane without trace. He didn’t reckon on the hourly handshakes, otherwise he would have kept the SATCOM offline for the duration, imo.
If the above scenario is accepted as reasonable, then at least one important conclusion can be drawn, namely that he wouldn’t have planned any evasive or delaying manoeuvres between 18:24 and the FMT, apart from making sure he turned at the CHENNAI/Kuala Lumpur FIR boundary, and cleared the tip of Sumatra by a respectable 60Nm. Banda Aceh airport is closed at night. He guessed Indonesian primary radar wouldn’t pose a threat, wouldn’t see him making his FMT.
@Dennis
Trust me to get it twisted, Dennis. Yes you do indeed have my pity, that goes without saying, and my admiration 🙂
@ALL
Thought for the day: I think he planned to arrive at fuel exhaustion a few minutes after sunrise, at about S38. He would only have ended up at S35 id something drastic had happened after FMT, and he ended up as a ghost flight on Mag Heading. He would never have planned to be in sunlight for an extended period, or flown towards the Australian coast.
@all,
There are two interesting “coincidences” in timing.
1. Three events appear to occur essentially simultaneously at 18:22: (a) the SDU power restoration, (b) the initiation of the right offset maneuver, and (c) the last radar contact. It is possible that (b) was driven by the completion of (a), and perhaps (c) was induced by the aircraft banking in (b).
2. As pointed out to me by Don Thompson, this time (18:22) is within a minute or less of being exactly 1 hour after diversion (at ~17:21-17:22). This precise 1 hour interval could be a coincidence, or possibly it was a timed event.
@DrB: Those coincidences are not lost on most of us. There’s also the (turn or descent) that initiated before 18:40. A lot of events occurred in a relatively short amount of time.
@ROB: “I think he planned to arrive at fuel exhaustion a few minutes after sunrise, at about S38”
Respectfully, I think that Victor is correct that the best data we have is the 7th arc as reduced by drift analysis.
As I understand it, t’s almost certain that any terminus on the 7th arc south of 35S would have resulted in debris being recovered in WA, the more so that the organizers of the October 2014 and October 2015 WA beach clean-ups [Tangaroa Blue and various government entities] were aware of, and motivated to look for MH370 material.
As we discussed here earlier, most models show 30S to 32S as more promising; the 35S location appears likely only if we admit a rather narrow westerly current at that latitude in April 2014.
Suggestions of termini much further north [eg, 10S] would also fail in predicting debris in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Andamans, etc. Though such negatives are less meaningful than the WA case.
I think the ATSB dismissal of termini around 30S — to the extent based on absence of early recovery in east Africa [eg, Tanzania]– is much weaker since there was neither an effort or awareness necessary to bring debris in.
@TBill, Re your post to @Donald ‘we don’t have to prove that the pilot did it’
Sadly, we have Germanwings 9525 where Lubitz committed murder/suicide by locking the PIC out of the cockpit . The question is ‘what safety measures have been implemented since then?And are airlines even compelled to assess risks and address these accordingly? Another Germanwings/MH370 event could easily happen again.
@Irthe Turner
The sad thing about Germanwings is that it happened after MH370, which no action was taken due to less than 100% proof of rouge pilot in MH370. Finally after Germanwings many airlines went to a 2-in-cockpit rule. Keep in mind we are not necessarily privy to changes made by airlines since then.
The main thing we can say is that when MH370 happened, the procedures and aircraft design at that time were lax enough – specifically in Malaysia and MAS – to allow MH370 to happen. We know other places (USA, EU) probably have much tighter control (air marshals, primary radar coverage, probably some secret stuff, etc etc).
New statement from Voice 370
MH370 families were also told that the authorities involved were studying a proposal by a private entity to search for the plane at their own cost…In light of the narrowed search and (free of cost) willing search party, the lack of communication from the governments involved is very distressing for family members whose agony festers.
@Ikr “Respectfully, I think that Victor is correct that the best data we have is the 7th arc as reduced by drift analysis.”
Unfortunately for me I am unable to place any trust in the validity of the drift studies. These analyses have seemed to move with the tide (pun intended). Call me cynical if you like but as I see it, the drift studies only appeared to acquire their miraculously predictive qualities once the search failed to find anything at S38. In my opinion, the search failed to find anything at S38 only because the search strategy did not or could not seriously consider a scenario in which the pilot deliberately glided the plane for 100Nm or more following flameout, with the intention of making the terminus more difficult to locate.
I still think the aircraft ended up downrange of the DSTG Bayesian hotspot. I think the pilot’s intention was to arrive in as remote a part of the SIO as the fuel load would allow, while remaining undetected throughout. The best way to achieve this would be to fly a straight line LNAV course that arrived at the terminus (flameout) when the Sun was just above the horizon.
@Ikr
Discussion continued from above: One particularly interesting thing about S38. This is the section of the 7th arc that happens to coincide approximately with the furthest range the aircraft could achieve on the available fuel, if it flew in a straight line in an economical cruise mode. I believe I am right in saying that DrB had previously estimated flameout would have occurred at about 00:12, or some 5 minutes before the assumed actual flameout if the plane had flown MRC mode, ie. the most economical mode from 18:40 onwards. However, my own work had suggested that a constant Mach 0.81 cruise at FL350 would fit the atmospheric conditions and the BTO data (cross the ping rings at the right places at the right times). However, because a constant M0.81 is less fuel efficient that MRC, flameout would occur sometime before 00:17. DrB estimated at least 10 minutes before. Now I had previously estimated that the Sun would be about 5 minutes above the eastern horizon at 00:17, at flameout, which led me to speculate that possibly the fuel had lasted several minutes longer than the pilot (more specifically the FMC) had calculated at the start of the journey south, which meant he arrived in the terminal area a little late, perhaps 15 minutes late. Because, if flameout had actually occurred at 00:02 instead of at 00:17, the Sun would be 2deg above the horizon, instead of 5deg. Basically I saying I think the pilot had calculated beforehand very precisely the desired lighting conditions for flameout but that on the night, the plane flew more economically, and the fuel lasted a further 15 minutes or so.
However, to reach the 7th arc terminus at 35deg south the plane has to fly at less than optimal speed, and has to change its heading/track en route. But I maintain that everything went to plan on the night, and therefore there is no requirement for considering less that optimal speed or changes in reading/track and/or altitude.
@Rob: You are going to have a hard time persuading people to ignore the drift studies that say that 38S latitude is too far south.
@Rob
The CSIRO approach to drift modeling is flawed. Dropping things in the ocean and watching where they go shows what is possible not what is probable. The original question was whether the 38S location was possible for the Reunion debris. The answer is that it is possible. The fact that no debris has been found in WA weighs heavily against 38S and beyond as a terminus.
@ROB, Victor, Dennis:
I’m generally a bit skeptical of reasoning from absence, but I’m convinced that absence of debris on the WA coast [and for that matter, absence further east on the south coast] is real, and as Victor and Dennis say, this makes it difficult to accept any terminus south of 35S [and there only if a westerly current is confirmed for April 2014].
To document this absence, it’s worth sharing this response I received from a Tangaroa Blue spokesperson concerning their beach clean-ups in 2014 and 2015.
” You can find brief articles toward the end of each of our annual WA reports for 2014 and 2015 which can be found here http://www.tangaroablue.org/resources/reports/category/18-wa.html . There was no new information to provide for the 2016 report so MH370 was not discussed in that report…..
… our volunteers were generally aware that there may be debris from the aircraft washing ashore. The actual identification of possible items of interest was and to some extent still is based on the identification of items not usually found on the West Australian coast and which might be specific to an aircraft. These were generally understood by us and communicated to our volunteer base as cabin items, parts of the aircraft and items with identification markings and wording connecting them to an aviation origin. There was considerable media coverage on the issue in the months following the disappearance and the general public were also active in looking for debris independent of our program.
… so far as we know there was no awareness program conducted by the Australian Authorities aside from advice from them in the media about reporting items of interest. TBF, however, did have its program in place, a state-wide annual clean-up event and a pre-existing reporting avenue to the Authorities.
I hope this goes some way to answering some of your questions. Also happy to answer further questions about marine debris on the WA coast as needed
@VictorI,
@Gysbreght,
I’ve not been able to to find Ed Obert’s drag polar chart or equations (without purchasing the book for $$$). Do you have an electronic version or equations based on the chart?
I did find this drag polar chart in Boeing’s Jet Transport Performance Methods:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzOIIFNlx2aUS21nWm0tbWlZRGs/view?usp=sharing
I would think it would be applicable to 7X7 aircraft. However, it does not match up with drag coefficient Gysbreght posted ~May14 (drag coeff .0241 from lift coef .4671 ) for Aero Figure 1 LRC conditions.
I get lift coef = 0.04669 (in agreement with G.) and (from chart above) drag coef = 0.0361 at M0.84. That’s quite different from the 0.0241 quoted as being from Professor Obert’s chart. Any idea why they are so different?
@DrB: A lift coefficient of CL = 0.04669 seems quite low for a typical cruise condition, if that is what you are saying. How are you calculating CL? Perhaps you slipped the decimal point?
DrB wrote at 2:34 am: “I did find this drag polar chart in Boeing’s Jet Transport Performance Methods: (…) I would think it would be applicable to 7X7 aircraft.”
Really?
[Comments here are closed. Please continue the discussion under the new article.]