Ocean Infinity (OI) has completed the first phase of its subsea search for MH370 in the Southern Indian along the 7th arc in the Southern Indian Ocean (SIO). As expected, Armada 7806, with its fleet of three autonomous vehicles (AUVs), is searching in the vicinity of the area proposed by OI in March 2024, generally between 34S to 35S latitudes. Armada 7806 is currently in port at Fremantle for refueling and resupplying. It is expected that the turnaround will take around a day, and that Armada 7806 will return to the 7th arc for the second phase of the search.
We know approximately what areas were searched based on the position of Armada 7806 as deduced by AIS reports transmitted via satellite and made available to the public via various marine tracking sites. However, the exact locations searched depend on the track followed by the AUVs after they are launched from the ship during their “sorties”, and this is unknown. Because launches and recoveries while the Armada 7806 is moving slowly or stopped, some additional information can be gleaned by the ship speed.
The figure below shows more details of the search area. Shown in the figure is the sonar data from the first search managed by the ATSB as contracted to Fugro and GO Phoenix (mixed brown shading), the outline (yellow) of the previous search conducted by OI using Seabed Constructor and its team of seven AUVs, and the outline (red) of new areas that OI proposed to search in March 2024. The tracks of Armada 7806 are shown by the circles and connected lines (purple), where the circles are representative of hourly position reports. Where the circles are clumped is indicative of either a launch or recovery of an AUV, which gives us some insight as to the areas searched.
The first location searched was the area we previously designated as the High Priority Search Area, which lies due south of where MH370 was estimated to have crossed the 7th arc, as presented in UGIB 2020. This lies at the border of where OI conducted its previous search. Other areas searched by Armada 7806 were either previously searched by the ATSB or OI. In some cases, Armada 7806 is searching in an area previously searched by BOTH the ATSB and OI.
The reason for re-searching these areas is apparent from the figure below, which includes the terrain features from bathymetry data and shows the spots in which the ATSB sonar data is poor quality, ambiguous, or missing (so-called “data holidays”), depicted as olive-green areas with white outlines. It is apparent that the search so far has focused on “filling in” the areas missed by previous searches, in particular where the terrain was challenging due to steep slopes. Although the AUVs have better ability to follow terrain contours in comparison to the towfish vehicles used by the vessels contracted by the ATSB, the steepest of slopes also present challenges to the AUVs.
Discussion
The search strategy to date is to progressively eliminate large areas that have the highest probability of finding the MH370 debris field. In our opinion, it makes sense to completely eliminate the areas closest to the 7th arc before proceeding outward from the 7th arc into areas not previously searched. The final BFO values at 00:19:29 and 00:19:37 suggest that at these times, MH370 was in a progressively steep descent of around 0.7g downward acceleration. It is possible that the pilot recovered from this dive and glided further from the 7th arc. After infilling the previous data, the search will likely continue into the new areas proposed by OI, which would at least partially consider the dive-glide scenario. Progressively eliminating large areas of seabed is more sensible than jumping between hotspots. Even the High Priority Search Area we recommended only represents an area that we believe has higher relative probability than other areas, but cannot considered to be a “high probability” area because of the many assumptions that were required to reconstruct the UGIB 2020 path.
Finally, we consider the search recommendation presented in Ulich and Iannello (2023), which included the provision for searching outward from the 7th arc to account for a 70-NM glide. This is shown by the black racetrack below, and includes most of the area proposed by OI to search. This would extend past the 15,000 km2 represented by the search area OI proposed in March 2024 (red outline). It would also include the search area recommended by Blely-Marchand, which surrounds 35.6°S, 93.1°E.
It is unclear whether OI will search other areas if the search in this area is unsuccessful.
Thanks for keeping the blog going, Victor, with all the updates. I hope Malaysia signs the contract, and that OI finds (or has already found!) the debris field. That would bring closure for us all.
If that 2014 EK407 track info mentioned earlier is even approximately accurate, at 19:41Z the 2nd Arc was over 300 km ahead and MH370 was likely 1,000 km farther north. At 20:41Z EK407 was 40 minutes past the 3rd Arc and 600 km beyond MH370. Closest pass might have been 400 km off the right wing. I don’t think that matches the conveyed pilot description.
@sk999 said: However, if we assume that the “Aus ATC (Calculated)” values are correct and match them to various possible routes for MH370, the best match comes with an LNAV route that crosses EK407 at around 93.1E, 4.3S at UT 20:01 and then intersect the 7th arc at -38.5, which is back in the original DSTG zone.
This is VERY interesting. Although we don’t know the veracity of the report, if it proves to be true, we finally have a new, unbiased data point that can help discriminate among reconstructed paths.
All,
Some additional information regarding EK407. First, the main data page is here:
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/A6EDO/history/20140307/1125Z/YMML/OMDB
The track log contains ATC radar and ADS-B data at the start of the flight around Melbourne and for about an hour as it passed north of Learmonth on the west coast of Australia, but for the flight over central Australia and out over the Indian Ocean there are only ATC (Calculated) values.
I have constructed a flight model based on the filed flight plan starting at waypoint BORTO (where it reached cruising altitude) and ending at waypoint ELATI (almost 7 hours flight time), constant Mach 0.840, altitudes as given in the track log. This flight model does a decent job predicting the timing between the Melbourne and Learmonth segments of the flight, with an error of +14 sec at the last measured point. The ATC (Calculated) values show a clear drift of nearly 2 minutes for the segment over central Australia. Using my flight model to extrapolate out to the intersection with potential MH370 flight paths, the ATC (Calculated) values again show a drift relative to my model of an additional 2 minutes (in the sense that the ATC timing is early relative to mine). This suggests that the sighting of MH370 occurred at about 20:03:30 or 20:04. This later timing moves the 7th arc crossing north to about -37.7 to -38.0.
This analysis is all obviously tentative and would benefit from any ACARS data being made available.
@sk999
Are your times based on where you think the paths crossed? It would seem MH370 would have to be in front of EK407 some distance in order for the crew to notice it. Probably further, the greater the altitude difference, if any. It seems you think timing is definitely such that EK407 could have noticed it, had they been looking in the right direction?
@Victor
@sk999
There’s an outside chance that Airservices Australia might have the EK407 position data, but I suspect we’re now well past the point where they would retain such data. Airservices has ADS-B coverage over the entire continent and in the oceanic area the aircraft would have made periodic ADS-C position reports via satellite.
GlobusMax,
Yes, right now I am just try matching positions. These will need to be adjusted at some point to account for viewing distance, but right now that is a minor issue. I have a grid of models that cover a range of final 7th arc latitudes and I am eyeballing the one that most closely matches.
Good luck. I sure hope we can find this thing!!
@sk999
Steve, might I ask at what time does your model have EK407 at MUTMI?
Mick – 20:06:52. This information is provided without warranty. Caveat Emptor.
I suspect that many readers of this website will already be familiar with what’s being discussed in this video, but as a “back of the class kid“, I found it informative.
It’s a discussion by Richard Godfrey and Geoffrey Thomas about EK407‘s possible sighting of MH370. Apparently the pilot, who is named in the video, made an incident report after the flight. The ‘IG Group’ gets mentioned 4:30 minutes from the end. I found this link (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZGeWd5odc0), as part of a discussion of the EK407 sighting on the MH370 sub-Reddit ….
@all,
Armada 7806 is now scheduled to stay even longer at AMC Henderson as Fremantle Ports updated departure now showing as 0800 hrs (UTC +8) Fri 7 Mar 2025 (had already changed earlier today).
Ocean Infinity could be waiting longer for flight arrivals into Perth Airport of any Malaysian observers that might be required onboard or four week swing change crew running late.
https://www3.fremantleports.com.au/vtmis/dashb.ashx?db=fmp.public&btn=ExpectedMovements
@sk999
Thanks Steve, caveat noted.
@sk999. The southern path for my MEKAR-SANOB-IGEBO-RUNUT-4085S hypothesis position at 20:03:30 is -5.904, 92.865. How does that align with your EP for EK407?
Thanks for the update.
I hope if the search is unsuccessful their route to their next job will take them past the java hotspot / acoustic anomaly. My understanding is that this is so localised it would take very limited time to search (24 hours?). That path is plausible, has some external evidence and is very localised. Would be worth checking on the way out if nothing is found in the main search zone
Paul Smithson,
I get -4.418 93.347, which puts your position 90 nm south.
However, it could be that all this is a red herring, as Capt. Smith’s flight may actually have been the day after.
@sk999
Indeed. According to the logbook page shared on another website, Capt Smith departed MEL on 8 Mar, in A6-EDB. The FlightAware records show the aircraft that operated EK407 on 7 Mar was A6-EDO. If those details are correct, he couldn’t possibly have seen MH370.
@Victor
Re: EK407
Recognizing we cannot go much further re: EK407 without validation, UGIB is perhaps less good match…if my math is correct the relatively northern start point at Arc2, relatively easterly path give a quite late crossing of the operating line 0898S-MUTMI.
@Andrew: Also, there WAS an EK407 flight that left Melbourne at 10:20L on March 8 and the aircraft was A6-EDB, all in agreement with the Captain Smith’s logbook.
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/A6EDB/history/20140308/1125Z/YMML/OMDB
How embarrassing.
@TBill: Unless Capt Smith’s logbook entry is incorrect, he could not have seen MH370.
[…] The FlightAware tracklog of EK407 is here. If I get time, I may at least approximate the location of the two planes to see if it is even possible, if someone doesn’t beat me to it. Note that this data is likely estimated, given the location, so ideally Emirates archived and could produce EK407’s actual recorded GPS log per the video. Update: Sk999 has indeed already done a preliminary analysis. The post is a bit cryptic, but it seems the timing could work. They infer that if true, it would indicate a more southern location. Update 2: sk999 refined their analysis. […]
@TBill.
I have downloaded Captain Smith’s logbook page, and in my opinion, Captain Smith’s logbook entry is almost certainly correct.
As any pilot will tell you, you fill in your logbook AFTER LANDING, at THE END OF THE FLIGHT, NOT before takeoff.
The date when he took off from Melbourne was the 7th.
The date when he landed in Dubai was the 8th, and that is the date entered in the logbook.
@sk999
We need more validation including possibly from Emirates and ATSB. The other question I would have: what did joint investigation team know at the time? Is this already known?
Is posting the website page with the logbook page verboten? I’m having trouble finding it via the source.
@ventus45
Assuming the rules in Dubai are the same as those in other jurisdictions, the date recorded in the logbook is the date the flight COMMENCED, not the date it ended.
@ventus45: Nobody doubts the log entry was completed after the flight. The questions arises as to whether the date entered is the departure or arrival date. As @Andrew has said, the departure date is entered. This makes sense as it is the departure date and flight number that identify a specific flight. We also have the discrepancy in aircraft registration between Captain Smith’s logbook entry and the FlightAware data for the flight departing on March 7.
Do you really think that Captain Smith made a mistake in both the aircraft AND the departure date? Especially when there is a flight the next day that matches his logbook entry exactly.
ventus45: Of course you fill in the logbook after the flight. But the date will be the date of departure, not arrival. Note that the aircraft that did fly MEL-DXB on the 7th (A6-EDO) was not the aircraft that that Smith flew on the 8th (A6-EDB), according to his logbook.
@sk999
@ventus
Correction my reply 11:11 above was intended for @ventus
EK407 was close to midnite late takeoff for possible date confusion, and the 7-March EK407 flight certainly was interesting close flyby to expected MH370 location. I had not been aware that there was this late 407 flight, as a difference from normal air traffic that night.
I’ve always felt that any serious investigation would have requested from Emirates (and maybe did request) further GPS details on EK343 approaching MEKAR/N571. Also EK425 was close flyby to Arc7 at about 20-22s at about crash time, which was of some interest to me back when we were working NZPG type paths.
@TBill: Do you really believe that Capt Smith incorrectly entered the date AND aircraft registration in his log? Isn’t much more likely that his entries are correct, in accordance with the FlightAware data?
Joseph Coleman helpfully provided a comment including a link to a FlightAware track log for UAE407, YMML to OMDB.
In its depiction of a flight log, FlightAware unhelpfully obfuscates the identity (registration, in this case, A6-xxx) of an aircraft operating a given service, UAEzzz.
The operating times for the flight tracked in the log given by Joseph Coleman for UAE407 on 7th March 2014 are:
Dep/sch: 1125UTC; Out: 1247UTC; Off: 1306UTC
Arr/sch: +1/0056UTC; On: +1/0246UTC; In: +1/0246UTC
The above departure and arrival times coincide with a crossing of 9M-MRO’s track while MRO proceeded south.
Captain Martyn Smith’s pilot’s logbook records him on the flight crew operating A6-EDB for the return YMML-OMDB leg. A6-EDB certainly did operate UAE407 on 8th March 2014:
Dep/Sch: 1125UTC; Out: 1120UTC; Off: 1139UTC
Arr/Sch, +1/0109UTC; On: +1/0116UTC; Arr: 0129UTC
However, A6-EDB departure from YMML operating UAE407 occurred 11h6m after 9M-MRO’s final SATCOM transmission.
@Mick Gilbert,
@Ventus45,
(who should both be awake)
Do you have any info as to if A7806 is headed out again ?
@George G
The Fremantle Ports movement system shows that Armada 78 06 is now confirmed to depart at 1630 AWST (UTC+8) today, 6 March.
https://www3.fremantleports.com.au/VTMIS/dashb.ashx?db=fmp.public&btn=TodaysMovements
@Victor
Per above, right now ALSM says he can confirm the Capt. was not the pilot that day.
@George G
G’day George,
Yes, awake but not necessarily alert.
Per Andrew’s note above, 06 is presently scheduled to depart at 1630 AWST today, 6 March.
@sk999 The FlightAware link you posted is the correct one for the night MH370 disappeared, however, a photo has surfaced showing Captain Smith’s logbook, and it shows that he flew the MEL-DBX route on airframe A6-EDB. The link you post is airframe A6-EDO. Here is the link to Captain Smith’s flight: https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/A6EDB/history/20140308/1125Z/YMML/OMDB
The aircraft departed 20 hours after MH370’s last ping at the 7th arc. Whatever Captain Smith saw that night could not have been MH370.
@All
I take the point that you log the flight you take, and since in this case, you are traversing many time zones and crossing a “day boundary” both in terms of local times and in utc times, so I conceed and withdraw the post to TBill.
On reviewing the flightaware links posted, I conceed that Captain Smith must have operated the Saturday night flight, not the Friday night flight.
That now raises the question, assuming the sighting itself is valid, what did he see ?
What was out there, almost exactly 24hrs after 9M-MRO may have transited that area of sky, pparently operating “due regard” ?
PS: Re sailing of Armada 7806, I have not checked yet. I have been busy with the above.
Armada 7806 sailing:
https://www3.fremantleports.com.au/VTMIS/dashb.ashx?db=fmp.public&btn=ExpectedMovements
Currently shows that she is set to depart at 16:30 local today = 060830zMar25
@Andrew,
@Ventus, Mick,
Ta.
As at 0830 UTC 6 March, 78 06 is departing the Marine Complex at Henderson, Western Australia. The AIS is presently showing her destination as Cape Town, South Africa (ETA 21 March), which seems to indicate a direct passage with no loitering.
Maybe Ocean Infinity has found #MH370 or already giving up as still no contract with Malaysia?
PS. Great circle distance PER-CPT is ~4701 nautical miles @ 9 knots = ~522 hrs or ~3x weeks voyage. So don’t think Armada 7806 would have time to stop and search further for MH370 with that timing? Seems hard to believe current search could be already over?
http://www.gcmap.com/mapui?P=PER-CPT
PPS. Armada 7806 current heading of 254° is a 180° reciprocal course to their last 74° course into Fremantle from #MH370 search area but great circle shortest direct course to Cape Town is likely 237° from Fremantle end so still too hard to call what is going on as could also be an AIS input error onboard?
http://gcmap.com/mapui?P=PER-CPT
@Ben John: The last AIS report I have shows Armada 7806 on a course of 255° towards the previous search area.
@Pierre: Welcome to the blog!
You might not have seen the previous comments that already explained that Capt Smith was not on the plane that was in the air when MH370 went missing. Unfortunately, those promoting that Capt Smith saw MH370 are doubling down rather than correcting their mistake. This is typical behavior.
@ventus
The EK407 incident becomes a another case study in the difficultly with “eyewitness” reports. This case only worked if it was documented at the time, which it was suggested air traffic reports were filed, but now we have no proof. Also the conflict with a southbound at FL380 could be studied, but I do not think we are expecting air traffic that day at that hour in that direction. I have to guess we are hearing a composite memory from various flights. In fairness to Capt, he reached out to Mentour Pilot to try to assess his recollections.
@Victor Iannello
Hi Victor, thanks, happy to be here.
It seems like I only now just realized newest comments are on the bottom, I was looking at the top and thought I was replying to a fresh comment 😉
For those who are fans of waypoint RUNUT (the most southerly named waypoint that MH370 might have used), I note that it is included in the flight plan for today’s EK407, and it should arrive there in about 3 hours.
On its current course, Armada 7806 is headed towards a ridge that it previously searched during the last phase. This is 40 NM to the southwest of the High Priority Search Area and within the Ulich/Iannello search area limits based on a 70-NM glide.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GlYgxf3XUAARMal?format=jpg&name=medium
@TBill
Bill, re “The EK407 incident becomes a another case study in the difficultly with “eyewitness” reports.“, I have a different perspective. This is yet another case study, brought to us by the same production company that has served up so many other examples of rank delinquencies of scholarship, in a) the importance of data validation, and b) how arrogance and intransigence can turn misinformation into disinformation.
Victor,
it looks like you are considering advising the OI to continue searching within the area outlined in black, up to 70NM from the arc, in the case that the plane is not in the current recommended area.
I don’t think it is a good idea and here is why:
1. That limit comes from yours and Bobby Ulich paper “Improved Drift Model and Search Recommendations for MH370” which is mostly based on ocean drift studies
2.The drift study itself was based on data CSIRO predicted tracks which are provided for the area within 25km (13.5NM) from the arc. Unless you got some additional data, I don’t think that would be enough to make an estimate for the much larger area, basically 5 times further away from the arc.
3. Can drift models which predict the position of the flotsam 15 months after the crash cannot be considered more reliable than data gathered
I want to repeat something which I already said before regarding the search approach (not the search location itself) because I am fighting for it. THE TRUE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH WOULD BE TO FIRST COMPLETLY SEARCH THE AREA RECOMMENDED BY ATSB, INCLUDING BOTH LARGER UN-SEARCHED AREAS AND DATA HOLIDAYS, BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER BECAUSE ONLY THAT AREA MATCHES ALL THE DATA AND ALL REASONABLE ASSUMPTIONS. If the plane is not there only then we have to see what the weakest link is proceed in direction of correcting it.
@Marijan: The drift results have a much larger uncertainty than the methodology presented in UGIB 2020. Considering this uncertainty, the drift results are consistent with UGIB 2020. However, the search recommendation presented in that paper is based on UGIB 2020, not the drift results.
@All,
Update: ‘Armada 78 06’ at 07T1957Z 33°12.6’S 108°12.0’E Hdg 261.2°T Spd 9.6KTS. Wind 190°T/21KTS.
Course Made Good: From North of Rottnest Island @ 06T1105Z, GC Initial Course = 254.3°T.
Appears that vessel is still heading for the position that @VictorI previously alluded to. Wind and sea conditions will account for the leeway being made, indicated by the AIS recorded Hdg.
Victor if you don’t think drift results are particularly reliable, then there is even less reason that search stay concentrated around 34.2S.
The current proposal with extending to 70NM basically means favoring steep descent+recovery scenario over non-perfect data match.
This partly controlled flight does not seem to be very logical move and sounds more like an explanation that was pitched to reconcile the BFO data with inability to locate the plane at the time. I never heard an reasonable explanation why would someone wait prolonged period of time of steep dive before executing recovery maneuver.
In any case, now everyone seems to be occupied with convoluted port data and course of Armada 7806, but if you wanted to hear readers opinion on possible future search area expansion, I am definitely for moving along the arc south within 22NM limit and filling the data holes rather than increasing its width.
Many readers here are familiar with my interest in a southern terminus. I have set out the reasoning and underlying analysis in further detail. Your commentary is welcome.
1-pager summarising why 39.6S should be a strong candidate for search https://tinyurl.com/yc6y92tf
Methods, Results, Discussion summarised in powerpoint format (17 slides with notes) https://tinyurl.com/3hccs8ed
@Marijan: I get criticized as much for ignoring the possibility of a glide as I do for considering it. The truth is, we don’t know. And there is as much sentiment for moving north on the arc as there is for moving south.
Ultimately, it’s OI that decides where the search should be.
I wonder what specific evidence OI has decided to base its proposed search area on. We know the hotspots, but the actual proposed search area is pretty specific. @paul smithson your analysis seems to make sense to me. I have also come to a similar conclusion that 38-40S may be plausible. As Victor said, ultimately OI decides where the search should be- but does anyone know exactly why they seem sure about that area?
Hello everyone My first comment on this site, you are great guys, previously I wrote comments only on Richard Godfrey’s website.
About the steep descent: it seems very logical to me that the pilot did not want to wait 20-30 minutes and plan for the ocean surface if he was already ready to land on the water. Don’t forget that unlike in other disasters, the pilot wasn’t worried about the Boeing 777’s maneuvers and the passengers were hypoxic (though not necessarily hypoxic). Therefore, he sent the 9M-MRO into a steep dive, then he could level off, wait for the speed to decrease and make another dive until he dropped low enough, wait for the speed to reset again, and then proceed to landing on the water. And in this scenario, it is obvious that he did not know about the 7th arc and was not going to fly far away. I doubt that the person who came up with such a plan would just let the plane fall into the ocean out of control.
As for the drift, theoretically the crash site is located anywhere starting at 35S and moving further north along the 7th arc. At the same time, next to 34S-35S we have satellite images of the Pleiades, and next to 28S-32S we have some objects on the ocean surface that were not caught.
I do not believe that Armada 78 06 will go to Cape Town after exploring such a small area. Any reasonable businessman would not send a ship across the Indian Ocean without a firm intention to do a good job even without a contract. And it seems that for OI, the successful search for MH370 in the near future is more important than the $70 million from Malaysia (although this is certainly a problem)
I’m curious to know why Amada 78 06’s first period of searching seemed so inordinately short before a need to resupply. Why did the vessel traveled at such a pace to Fremantle (~12 knots), whilst for the return trip the vessel is cruising at its regular speed (~10 knots). There’s something going on that hasn’t been disclosed.
@Don Thompson. With the Digital Still Camera capability of the Hugin 6000 does it also have a floodlight for depth shots do you know?
Armada 7806 remains on course towards a steep slope that was searched in the previous phase. Revisiting a previously searched area is a very good sign.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GlhOgTjXoAAx4Ry?format=jpg&name=medium
@Don. Re my above, I see it has an “Integrated Camera
and Laser System CathX Hunter.” Capability?
https://argeo.no/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Hugin-AUV-H6000.pdf
@David,
Yes, the Cathx system includes LED floodlighting, there isn’t even the slightest chink of light at abyssal depths.
(Cathx Ocean: Irish company based in Naas, Co Kildare).
@John Matheson,
Considering all available factors, the apparent haste during A78-06’s voyage to Fremantle appeared to be a following weather system, thus a desire to stay ahead of that system.
An AUV’s endurance is approximately 100hrs, another set of thee AUV sorties at full endurance may have resulted in the vessel being close to depleting its own fuel and crew supplies before reaching port. Open ocean isn’t the place to take risks or run reserves thin!
@All,
Update: “Armada 78 06” at 08T2015Z 33°56.9’S 104°40.3’E Hdg 258.2°T Spd 9.8KTS. Wind 170°T/10KTS.
CMG from North of Rottnest Is., GC Initial Course = 254.3°T
@Don Thompson. Thanks. Good for a scene survey for identification by programming for crisscross sweeps I imagine, though not much good for detail without direct control as per ROV.
Time needed might be short, mostly in ascent plus descent. Maybe just the one dive would do.
It appears that Malaysia has agreed to the contract with Ocean Infinity.
Article in The Malaysian Reserve.
@Victor,
“actively finalising a new search agreement” ?
@George G: Baby steps forward.
In a new comment on his website, RG explains that what the Emirates pilot saw and reported on the night of Mar 8, 2014 may have been a USN P-8 searching for MH370.
If so, how did USN know so quickly where MH370 had flown to?
@CMR
I think we need to wait for any verification of Capt Smith’s recollections, which he reportedly filed reports. Per @DonT above his flight would have taken off just 11 hours after MH370 went missing, it makes no sense (at the moment) for any aircraft for any reason to fly near EK407 in the wee hours of the morning in the middle of the ocean near MUTMI at high speed and high altitude that night.
@All: Armada 7806 continues towards a steep slope in the previously searched area with AIS destination set to Cape Town, South Africa. I believe there are three possibilities for this AIS destination:
1. During the last phase, something resembling a debris field was detected. Armada 7806 will travel to this spot, launch one or more AUVs, and get better data, including possibly images. After a short time gathering this data, it will travel to Cape Town before it is reassigned a new mission.
2. There are ongoing contractual issues between OI and Malaysia and the search will be cut short even if no debris field is detected.
3. The AIS destination is not correct, either due to an error or due to misdirection.
With the recent announcement by Malaysia saying that the contract is approved and the signing is imminent, it reduces the probability of (2). Once the contract is signed, we can completely eliminate this possibility.
If (3) is correct, we would expect that Armada 7806 would remain in the area for a number of weeks to collect more data, and then return to Fremantle.
It is difficult to assign relative probabilities to these three scenarios. Perhaps it is confirmation bias that I believe that (1) is most probable. In any event, we’ll know more in the coming days.
@TBill: We also never resolved the position of the “Singapore radar source” that was operating somewhere near Sumatra and the Nicobar Islands, although I fail to understand how any of this will help us find MH370.
https://mh370.radiantphysics.com/2017/02/11/singapore-radar-and-mh370/
@Victor. If there were even a single reliable radar return (Thai radar?) to confirm whether or not the plane turned from MEKAR towards SANOB it would be the quickest refutation/validation of the 39.6S hypothesis.
@All,
Update: “Armada 78 06” at 09T1940Z 34°34.8’S 99°T43.5’E Hdg 263.9°T Spd 10.4KTS. Wind 300°T/6KTS.
CMG from Rottnest Is., GC Initial Course = 254.23°T.
Dist. to 35°15’S 93°20’E = 318NM. Course = 261°T.
@TBill
Bill, if you look at the publicly available statements made by Captain Smith, he offers no time or location for his sighting. The notion that it occurred near MUTMI is a construction of convenience.
Realistically, the sighting might have occurred pretty much anywhere along the roughly 2,000 nautical mile stretch from Port Hedland to near the Melbourne – Colombo FIR boundary at ELATI.
It is worth noting that the stretch of EK407’s route between the Western Australian coastline and 106°E is crossed by a number of essentially north-south airways that carry traffic from western South-east Asia to Perth.
@paul smithson: Yes, any additional radar target would help discriminate amongst paths. At this point, I think that is highly unlikely.
Public domain, I agree. But I still wonder if MY were given Thai info that they are not at liberty to share.
Mick Gilbert,
While Captain Smith did not offer a time or location, he did state that it was when he was “… in a block from FL370 to FL390 over the Indian Ocean, cruise climbing at our discretion between these levels as our aircraft became lighter …” – i.e., performing a step climb. Now, he might might be misremebering the actual altitudes, but nevertheless the flight plans for both flights at issue called for a step climb from FL360 to FL380 around waypoint MUTMI. Consequently, the placing of the sighting at MUTMI was not a “construction of convenience”, it was a construction based on actual filed flight plans. At least, that was my thinking at the time when I thought that this alleged sighting was significant.
@sk999
Steve, I think that it is fairly clear that when Captain Smith’s account came to light, rather than properly verify it, or even seek a relatively normal, uncontroversial explanation, there was a headlong clamour to make it fit preconceived theories.
I’d offer a couple of observations regarding Captain Smith’s recollections and the flight plan.
His statement that his aircraft was “in a block from FL370 to FL390 over the Indian Ocean, cruise climbing at our discretion between these levels as our aircraft became lighter” strikes me as odd. He has nominated odd, east-bound flight levels for what was a west-bound flight. EK407 certainly should not have been climbing between FL370 to FL390; more likely between FL340 to FL360, or FL360 to FL380.
And according to the listed flight plan, over the Indian Ocean, the flight could have been step climbing from as far back along its route as crossing the Western Australian coastline at 20S19. Here, if you are trying to make sense of what appears to be a poorly recollected event, rather than force fitting it to a preconceived hypothesis, encountering north-south traffic while step climbing would be more likely explained in the region between 20S19 and 0899S.
My argument is that the contention that the recollected event occurred at MUTMI was constructed because it conveniently fitted a preconceived hypothesis, ie a construction of convenience.
@CMR. Missing from that comment was any support/confirmation of Captain Smith’s sighting by his offsider.
@Victor @PaulS
I support Victor’s proposal for add’l freedom of information request(s). Part of the purpose would be to discover if there are data/clues that were withheld. I am pretty sure one newspaper said Thailand possibly saw MH370 over the Andaman Sea. I do feel there was a decent effort to provide adequate data for flight path estimators to do their work. I’ve recently submitted several data requests.
[Comments here are closed. Please continue the discussion under the new article.]