In the last blog article, I explained in simple technical terms why WSPR data cannot be used to track aircraft over long distances, and certainly cannot be used to reconstruct the flight path of MH370. The article concluded:
At long distances and at low transmission powers, the received signals from hypothetical aircraft scatter are simply too weak by many orders of magnitude. What is claimed to be discernable “anomalies” in signal strength attributable to forward scatter by aircraft are within the expected deviations in signal strength for long distance skywave propagation involving refraction off the ionosphere. Although aircraft scatter could be detected if the aircraft were close to either the transmitter or receiver and if the transmitted power were sufficiently strong, the detection of the aircraft requires signal processing to separate the Doppler-shifted scattered signal from the much stronger direct signal, and this data is not available in the WSPR database.
Since publishing that article, even more evidence supporting these conclusions was presented by me and other contributors in 667 blog comments, which include analyses of experimental data of HF scatter off of aircraft, and statistical analyses of the WSPR-tracking claims. I considered writing a new blog article with the updated results, but reasoned that the informed already understood that WSPR-tracking was junk science, the uninformed wouldn’t appreciate the significance of the new results, and the WSPR proponents were too dug in to do anything but continue to double down on their flawed theory.
A question often asked is “How were aircraft successfully tracked in validation tests?” Those that have studied the tests respond that the tests were not scientifically rigorous, and the positive results simply reflect the biases of the WSPR proponents, i.e., the data were cherry-picked to support the claims that historical WSPR data could be used to track aircraft.
One of the participants in the validation tests was Mike Glynn, who was an airline captain for Qantas. Mike has commented on the blog that he now agrees that the validation tests he helped conduct were not scientific. I repeat his comment below in its entirety and without edits:
Having just read this thread it’s appropriate that I comment on a couple of things.
My involvement with RG goes back to learning that he was after an appropriate flight to test his method of detecting aircraft via WSPR. I was in possession of a candidate plan, which happened to be my final flight in Qantas, although I was not aware of that fact at the time.
The flight was a ferry of a 747 with an oil leak in the number 4 engine which could not be repaired in Johannesburg and had to be flown, empty, to Sydney.
I had experience in post-maintenance air-tests in the 747 and this was considered desirable by QF.
The flight was planned overhead Perth and Adelaide then direct to Sydney, and due to the unusual routing, I thought it may have been a suitable candidate for a test of WSPR.
The kick in the tail was that we only got as far as Perth due to the oil leak accelerating during the flight and we diverted to Perth and landed with the engine still running, with the oil quantity indication bouncing off zero, but still with sufficient oil pressure to keep the EICAS quiet.
So, I contacted RG and the test went ahead. The test was not a success. RG initially appeared to be tracking the aircraft till it crossed the African coast, although there was a cross-track error of 20NM or so. He eventually reported that the aircraft had landed in Melbourne.
This was obviously incorrect, but he had been making some wrong assumptions regarding the aircraft type, weight and tracking and so we decided on another test which was a flight plan of a QFA330 from Apia to Adelaide.
I supplied RG with the details of the flight including weight, type and time of departure. We had done a search of most flight-trackers and the flight was not on the sites we checked. Only after the analysis was complete did we find a site which had the flight recorded; however, I do not believe RG found and used this site.
An informational error on my part at the beginning of the plan meant RG turned the aircraft the shortest way towards Australia (to the Right) after take-off, however there is a procedure for departures on RWY 08 at APIA to turn left due to terrain. RG had stated that WSPR does not supply a direction of turns so I accepted the error at the start of the plan due to the incorrect turn.
After a couple of days RG informed me that the flight was tracking to Brisbane.
We were preparing to stop the test at that point but the following day he stated that the aircraft was tracking to Sydney and the following day he stated that the aircraft had flown to Adelaide from overhead Sydney and landed there.
This was correct; however, no documentation was given to me to substantiate how he had arrived at this conclusion.
Considering the process so far, I wanted to do another test and had another one, an A380 flight from Sydney to an Asian port, ready to go.
RG declined another test as he wanted to start on the MH370 analysis. I wasn’t happy with this, but it was his decision.
However, my opinion remains that the test process was not scientific.
When RG produced his MH370 analysis it made little sense to me as an airline pilot. The track to the north of Sumatra is very irregular and I found it difficult to reconcile it to anything an airliner would fly.
I had not heard of the “loiter” hypothesis either, so the holding pattern was new to me.
I asked RG whether he had considered the weather in the area in his analysis and he said he hadn’t. Despite comments made about the weather analysis on this thread, the results make sense to me as an airline pilot, particularly the diversion away from the thunderstorms off the south coast of Sumatra.
Recently, however, I have revisited the WSPR track analysis. My knowledge of the characteristics and limitations of WSPR is basic, and I simply don’t have the appropriate background to comment on that with any authority.
However, as a former RAAF pilot, I was trained in the principles of radio navigation and off-airways navigation. Andrew Banks arrived at my squadron just as I was leaving and was trained in the same techniques.
In my opinion, the methodology used in the construction of the WSPR track does not conform to any known principles of aircraft navigation that I am aware of.
It is arbitrary in the extreme and, I believe, constructed only to satisfy the constraints of the only solid data available, the BTO and BFO data.
I realise now that I should have looked at this earlier. and avoided looking as if the construction of this track makes any sense from an aviation POV.
Thats my error.
I will be explaining why I believe this in due course.
Thank you for your time and understanding.
Mike
Perhaps this is a positive step towards a more scientific discussion of the flaws in using historical WSPR data to track aircraft.